Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1999

The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete
Ronald J. Gilson
Columbia Law School, rgilson@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the
Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route
128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/992

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME

74

JUNE 1999

NUMBER

3

THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF HIGH
TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS:
SILICON VALLEY, ROUTE 128, AND

COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
RONALD

J. GII.SON*

In recentyears, scholarsand policymakers have rediscoveredthe concept of industrialdistricts-spatialconcentrationsoffirms in the same industry or related industries. In this Article, Professor Gilson examines te relationship between hightechnology industrial districts and legal infrastructure by comparing the legal regimes of California'sSilicon Valley and Massachusetts'sRoute 128. He contends
that legal rides governing evmployee mobility influence the dynamics of high tednology industrialdistrictsby eitherencouragingrapid employee movement between
employers and to startups, as in Silicon Valley, or discouragingsuch movement, as
in Route 128. Because Californiadoes not enforce post-employment covenants not
to compete high technology firms in Silicon Valley gainfrom knowledge spillovers
between finns. These knowledge spillovers have allowed Silicon Valley firms to
thrive while Route 128 firms have deteriorated. Professor Gilson concludes with
three cautionarynotes. Firs4 the success of Silicon Valley firms suggests that per
capitafirm value will be greaterwhere intellectualproperty protection is somewhat
diluted, in contrast to tie traditionallaw and economics prescription that emphasizes fidl protection of intellectualproperty. Second, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, as developed in recent trade secret cases, threatens to undermine the
advantages conferred by Calfornia'slegal regime and should be considered with
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caution. Third, other regions may not be able to emulate California'ssuccess simply by replicatingits legal rules. Rather, policymakers in other states should consider the characteristics of local industries, weighing the advantages to those
industries of knowledge spillovers againstthe reduced incentives for initial innovation that result from decreased employer intellectualproperty rights.

Policymakers have rediscovered the concept of industrial districts,
especially high technology industrial districts. It is easy to understand
the attraction. The threat of continued loss of well-paying manufacturing jobs to low wage countries has become a central political issue
in the United States and other developed nations and a rallying cry for
trade protectionists. The experience of regions like Silicon Valley and
of what has come to be known as the "Third Italy"1 holds out the
promise of the brass ring: new jobs with high wages. 2 Hoping that
similar names presage similar outcomes, regions christen themselves
Silicon Mountain, Silicon Alley, Silicon Forest, or Silicon Glen.
The same phenomenon has also rekindled academic interest in
the subject. The concept of an industrial district-the spatial concentration of firms in the same or a related industry-dates to Alfred
Marshall writing in 1890.3 Marshall developed the concept of (and,
unfortunately, the phrase) agglomeration economies to describe the
input scale economies external to the firm but internal to the region
that are available to any firm as a result of the proximity of similar
firms. 4 The input is available more cheaply within the region because
of the spatial concentration of users. Marshall used the labor market
as an example of this increasing-returns phenomenon.5 As more firms
in an industry locate in a region, workers with the skills demanded by
the industry follow. The process is self-reinforcing: As more skilled
workers locate in a region, other firms in the industry follow. The
geographic concentration of firms results in a lower cost of skilled
labor.
1 The term "Third Italy" distinguishes a number of successful regions largely in north
and central Italy from "the impoverished South and the old industrial triangle of Genoa,
Turin, and Milan." Charles F. Sabel, Flexible Specialisation and the Re-emergence of Regional Economies, in Reversing Industrial Decline? Industrial Structure and Policy in Britain and Her Competitors 17, 22 (Paul Hirst & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 1989).
2 In 1996, Silicon Valley added some 50,000 jobs, while average wages grew at five
times the national average. In the same year, the average wage in Silicon Valley was
$43,510, compared with $28,040 nationally (in 1995 dollars). See John Markoff, A Gold
Rush from Software Reinvigorates Silicon Valley, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1997, at D1. As of
1990, wage rates in Italy's Emilia-Romagna region, which includes Carpi, Modena, and
Bologna, were twice the national average, and per capita income, ranked seventeenth out
of Italy's 21 regions in 1973, ranked second in 1986. See Bennett Harrison, Industrial Districts: Old Wine in New Bottles?, 26 Regional Stud. 469, 472 (1992).
3 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics 222-30 (8th ed. 16th prtg. 1964) (1890).
4 See id.
5 See id. at 225-26.
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Recent scholarship, styled the "new economic geography," 6 continues Marshall's stress on increasing returns in explaining industrial
clustering, but with two important shifts in emphasis. First, reflecting
the interest in high technology industrial districts evoked by their success, knowledge as an input subject to agglomeration economies receives central attention. Second, the new scholarship stresses the
dynamics that give rise to industrial districts, rather than the equilibrium conditions that describe their existence. The result has been a
recognition that industrial districts are path dependent-an industrial
district's location may result not from the invisible hand of efficiency,
but from "the details of the seemingly transient and adventitious circumstance ' 7 associated with its origin. In short, to understand the development and success of high technology industrial districts, "history
matters."8
In this Article, I analyze a factor bearing on the location and development of high technology industrial districts that has not received
attention in the economic geography literature: the legal infrastructure that supports the agglomeration economies and sustains regional
concentrations of high technology firms.9 The special importance of
legal rules to high technology industrial districts results from the new
emphasis on knowledge as an input subject to increasing returns. The
mechanisms and efficiency of knowledge transfer are shaped by two
groups of legal rules: those governing intellectual property and, because tacit knowledge 10 is most effectively transferred by the individuals in whom it is embedded, those relating to employee mobility.
Thus, I will argue, legal infrastructure prominently influences the dynamics of high technology industrial districts.
I take as the context of my analysis the juxtaposition of two familiar U.S. high technology industrial districts: Silicon Valley on the San
Francisco peninsula and Route 128 outside of Boston. The compari6 Masahisa Fujita & Jacques-Frangois Ihisse, Economics of Agglomeration, 10 J. Japanese & Int'l Econ. 339, 341 (1996); Paul Krugman, Space: The Final Frontier, J. Econ.
Persp., Spring 1998, at 161, 161.
7 Paul A. David & Joshua L. Rosenbloom, Marshallian Factor Market Externalities
and the Dynamics of Industrial Localization, 28 J. Urb. Econ. 349,368 (1990) (arguing that
spatial distribution of economic activity is highly sensitive to small differences in initial

conditions).

8 Fujita & Thisse, supra note 6, at 371.
9 Alan Hyde, Real Human Capital: The Economics and Law of Shared Knowledge
(May 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University Law Review),
also addresses the relation between legal rules and the operation of high technology industry. While our emphases differ, I have greatly benefited from Professor Hyde's interesting
work.
10 "Tacit knowledge" is the skill or expertise, as opposed to easily codiiable information, that employees acquire through experience. See infra notes 23-24, 67 and accompanying text.
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son has two important advantages. First, it allows me the benefit of
AnnaLee Saxenian's deep description of the history and operation of
these districts, as well as her assessment of the reason for Silicon Valley's continuing success and Route 128's ultimate decline." Second,
the comparison provides a natural experiment to test competing explanations for the two districts' differential performance. Consistent
with the new economic geography, Saxenian stresses the comparative
efficiency of interfirm knowledge transfer in Silicon Valley. In her account, knowledge is transferred between firms by the movement of
employees between employers and to start-ups. 12 She attributes
Silicon Valley's efficiency advantage, and the resulting performance
gap, to differences in the two regions' business cultures. 13 Silicon Valley's culture of mobility-the constant penetration of local firms' open
architecture by job-hopping engineers and the corresponding bias
against vertical integration-is much more conducive to the regional
distribution of innovative knowledge than Route 128's culture of career-long employment supported by more traditionally organized, vertically integrated firms.
I suggest here an alternative explanation for the two districts' differing efficiency at transferring knowledge between firms: differences
in the districts' legal infrastructures, particularly the rules governing
the enforceability of postemployment covenants not to compete.
Such covenants are promises by employees not to compete with their
employer, whether by working for a competitor or by starting a new
business, for a period of time after employment terminates. In my
account, the legal rules governing employee mobility are a causal antecedent of Saxenian's construction of a Silicon Valley business culture that supports job hopping and a Route 128 business culture that
discourages it. The legal rules are one of the poles around which the
shape of the business culture is formed.
The natural experiment results from the fact that Silicon Valley
and Route 128 have different legal rules governing employment mobility. Postemployment covenants not to compete have the potential
to restrict seriously the movement of employees between existing
firms and to start-ups and, hence, to restrict seriously employee-transmitted knowledge spillovers. California prohibits covenants not to
compete;' 4 Massachusetts enforces them. 15
11AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley
and Route 128 (1994).
12 See id. at 34-37.
13 See id. at 111-17.
14 See infra Part III.B.3.
15 See infra Part III.B.2.
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My focus on the enforceability of postemployment covenants not
to compete also responds to the concerns of the new economic geography. First, it ties the legal infrastructure directly to the mechanism
that gives knowledge within an industrial district its characteristic of
increasing returns. Knowledge, especially tacit knowledge, "spills
over" between firms through the movement of employees between
employers and to start-ups. Second, this aspect of the legal infrastructure dramatically illustrates the importance of initial conditions. The
different legal rules governing postemployment covenants not to compete in California and Massachusetts help explain the differences in
employee job mobility and therefore the knowledge transfer that Saxenian identifies as a critical factor in explaining the differential performance of Silicon Valley and Route 128. However, the difference in
legal infrastructure does not result from the California legislature's
efforts to provide the proper conditions for the development of high
technology industrial districts. Rather, the California prohibition
dates to the 1870s, a serendipitous result of the historical coincidence
between the codification movement in the United States and the new
state's efforts at developing a coherent legal system out of its conflicting inheritance of Spanish, Mexican, and English law. The existence
of this anachronistic legal rule during Silicon Valley's development
precluded the collective action problem associated with encouraging
employee mobility within a district.
Part I briefly develops the concept of agglomeration economies
that give rise to industrial districts and then sketches the new economic geography's emphasis on knowledge spillovers and path dependency. Part II summarizes Saxenian's account of Silicon Valley and
Route 128, which in turn tracks the new economic geography by focusing on knowledge spillovers as generative of agglomeration economies and on employee mobility as the means of interfirm knowledge
transfer in Silicon Valley. Part HI then offers an alternative explanation for the differences in employee mobility that Saxenian persuasively argues lie at the center of the two districts' differing
performances. Saxenian emphasizes culture-laid-back California
versus button-down New England. 16 In contrast, I stress differences in
the two districts' legal infrastructures-namely, the differential enforceability of covenants not to compete-as antecedent to differences in business culture. Part m also demonstrates how the
California legal infrastructure solves the collective action problem associated with encouraging knowledge spillover through employee mo16 See Saxenian, supra note 11, at 50-57 (contrasting Silicon Valleys less formal and
more open corporate culture with traditional hierarchical northeastern corporate culture).
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bility. Part IV then further develops the initial conditions that
ultimately supported the continued success of Silicon Valley by tracing
the origins of this critical aspect of Silicon Valley's legal infrastructure
to the peculiar circumstances immediately following California's statehood. Part V concludes by offering a cautionary note with respect to
the implications of my analysis for three related subjects: the standard
law and economics prescription to protect fully intellectual property
rights; a disturbing line of recent cases developing a doctrine of "inevitable disclosure" that threatens to turn trade secret law into the
equivalent of a judicially imposed covenant not to compete; and the
appropriate strategy for reforming a region's legal infrastructure to
encourage or preserve high technology industrial districts.
I
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY: AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES,
HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS

Economic geography seeks to explain "the location of factors of
production in space."'1 7 For our purposes, the object of the investigation is the presence of industrial districts: why firms in an industry
locate in geographic proximity to each other. The policy motivation
for the inquiry is readily apparent. If we can understand the conditions that produce high technology industrial districts, then we can
provide a blueprint for regions seeking to preserve or increase the
number and quality of available jobs.
The inquiry took modem form with Alfred Marshall's focus in
1890 on the potential for economies of scale external to the firm.18
The familiar concept of economies of scale internal to the firm contemplates that production costs will fall as firm output increases. Marshall, in contrast, was concerned with the effects of an increase in scale
at the regional level. Firms would cluster in an industrial district if
increased regional output-the scale of production outside the firmcaused input costs to decline. Marshall offered the cost of skilled labor as an example. As the number of employers of skilled workers
within a region increases, workers with those skills are drawn to the
region. As the number of skilled workers within a region increases,
employers in need of workers with those skills are drawn to the region. 19 The result, styled by Marshall an "agglomeration economy"
17 Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. Pol. Econ. 483,
483 (1991) [hereinafter Krugman, Increasing Returns].
18 Marshall, supra note 3, at 225-30.
19 See id. at 225. Marshall explained further:
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and in later literature a "Marshallian factor market externality,'" 0 re-

flects generally the propensity for an input's relative price to be lower
when the number of firms in a region that call for that input is
higher.21
At this point, it is important to keep in mind the limited power of
agglomeration economies in explaining the existence of industrial dis-

tricts. An industrial district has two geographic characteristics, one
relative and one absolute. The relative characteristic is the geographic
relation of firms to each other-their proximity in space. An industrial district represents a spatial clustering of firms somewhere. The
absolute characteristic is the actual location of the industrial districtits physical location. Agglomeration economies explain the relative
characteristic of an industrial district-why firms are close together.

The concept does not explain where in space the clustering occurs.
Spurred by the interest in high technology industrial districts, the
new economic geography has continued Marshall's emphasis on increasing returns, but with two important shifts in emphasis. First, reflecting the interest in high technology industrial districts, attention
has focused on knowledge as a critical input subject to agglomeration
economies.2 Second, reflecting the policy motivation for the inquiry,
more attention has been paid to understanding those elements of the
phenomenon that traditional agglomeration economies may not exWhen an industry has thus chosen a locality for itself, it is likely to stay there
long- so great are the advantages which people following the same skilled
trade get from near neighborhood to one another....
... Employers are apt to resort to any place where they are likely to find a
good choice of workers... while men seeking employment naturally go to
places where there are many employers who need such skill as theirs ....
Id.
See, e.g., Paul A. David et al., Marshallian Externalities and the Emergence and
Spatial Stability of Technological Enclaves 1 (July 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the New York University Law Review) (developing term "Marshallian factor market
externality"). The same phenomenon should occur with other mobile factors of production that have industry-specific value.
21 The analysis necessarily assumes that transportation costs for the input are positive.
While the discussion in the text suggests that the decline in input price results from a supply effect, input price is also affected by the risk sharing that can occur from the clustering
of employers. Assume that having to move one's residence to secure another job is costly
to an employee. If the risk of unemployment because of the failure of a particular employer is not perfectly correlated with the demand for workers at other firms in the region,
then the clustering of firms reduces the expected cost of unemployment to the employee.
That, in turn, reduces the portion of the wage paid to compensate for unemployment risk.
See David & Rosenbloom, supra note 7, at 351-53.
22 Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D Spillovers, 94 Scandinavian J. Econ. S29 (Supp.
1992); reviews the literature in this area.
20
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plain, specifically, the dynamics of industrial districts-how they start,
where they start, and, once started, their pattern of development.
That knowledge as an input is subject to increasing returns as a
result of geographic proximity initially presents something of a puzzle.
Precisely because of high technology, information has lost its geographic anchor. For example, the physical location of a law library is
unimportant when the case reports are available electronically
through Lexis or Westlaw. Nor does physical location matter very
much when new scientific discoveries are immediately announced
over the Internet. The reality of instantaneous communication
through the World Wide Web has linked the world scientific community through electronic rather than physical proximity. From this perspective, the effect of technology should be to eliminate knowledgebased agglomeration economies: The more important knowledge is as
an input, the less likely we should be to observe industrial clustering.
The puzzle disappears when one distinguishes between information on the one hand and knowledge or know-how on the other. The
distinction is in the tacit character of knowledge-not the formal conception of an innovation, but the skill and experience associated with
effectively creating, developing, and implementing it.23 Although advances in information technology may have caused the cost of transmitting the formal conception to become invariant to distance,
effectively transmitting tacit knowledge requires proximity, and hence
creates the potential for agglomeration economies.24 The need for
proximity for knowledge transmission creates the potential for two
kinds of agglomeration economies. Where tacit knowledge is acquired through a market relationship, as through the transmission of
technological know-how by contract with a supplier, the potential for
a Marshallian factor market externality exists. In contrast, informal
transfer of tacit knowledge creates the potential for technological ex23 See Maryann P. Feldman, The Geography of Innovation 14 (1994); id. at 53 ("Some
aspects of knowledge have a tacit nature that cannot be completely codified and transferred through blueprints and instructions."); David B. Audretsch & Maryann P. Feldman,
Innovative Clusters and the Industry Life Cycle, 11 Rev. Indus. Org. 253, 256 (1996) [hereinafter Innovative Clusters] (distinguishing tacit knowledge from information and noting
that cost of transmitting former increases with distance); David B. Audretsch & Maryann
P. Feldman, R&D Spillovers and the Geography of Innovation and Production, 86 Am.
Econ. Rev. 630, 638 (1996) [hereinafter R&D Spillovers] (arguing that due to importance
of knowledge spillovers, propensity for innovative activity to cluster is higher in industries
in which new economic knowledge plays greater role).
24 See Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic
Change 76-82, 115-16 (1982) (describing tacit nature of skills); cf. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy 49-65 (1958) (describing skills as
"the observance of a set of rules which are not known as such to the person following
them"); id. at 69-77 (describing processes of learning).
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temalities. In particular, the movement of workers between employers also serves to transfer tacit knowledge between firms.
Attention to the origins of agglomeration economies reveals the
second characteristic of the new economic geography. The feedback
process inherent in a Marshallian factor market externality-more
firms [skilled workers] in a region leads to a migration of skilled workers [firms] to the region, which leads to a migration of more firms
[skilled workers]-must start somewhere. However, nothing in the
analysis thus far explains how or where the loop begins. Efforts to
model the process suggest that the dynamics of district development
are very sensitive to initial conditions; that is, the course of subsequent
growth may depend importantly on small differences between regions
at the outset.25 As Brian Arthur has put it, an industrial district may
develop "not necessarily because of any intrinsic advantage of that
particular location, but because 'historical accident' placed certain
firms there initially and this concentration of firms in turn attracted
[through the lure of agglomeration economies] a high proportion of
subsequent entrants." 26
The combination of (i) knowledge as an input giving rise to a
Marshallian factor market externality, (ii) technological agglomeration economies, and (iii) the dependence on the history and initial
conditions of an industrial district's actual location brings us to a final
element of the economic structure of industrial districts: the life cycle
of an industrial district. There is persuasive empirical evidence that
the location of high technology industrial districts is associated with
major university complexes. 27 To be sure, that association is insuffi25 See generally, e.g., NV. Brian Arthur, 'Silicon Valley' Locational Clusters: When Do
Increasing Returns Imply Monopoly?, 19 Math. Soc. SCih 235 (1990); David & Rosenbloom, supra note 7; Fujita & 1Thisse, supra note 6; Krugman, Increasing Returns, supra
note 17.
26 Arthur, supra note 25, at 236; see also Krugman, Increasing Returns, supra note 17,
at 487 ("[S]mall changes in the parameters of the economy may have large effects on its
qualitative behavior.... The story also suggests that the details of the geography that
emerges-which regions end up with the population-depend sensitively on initial conditions."). David and Rosenbloom have observed:
[Tihe sensitivity of the ultimate dynamic outcomes to small differences in initial conditions, or to relatively small shocks, allows realistic scope for historical
events to play a role in the dynamics of spatial systems... [which in turn]
allow[s] the details of seemingly transient and adventitious circumstance to exert an enduring influence upon the spatial distribution of economic activity and
population.
David & Rosenbloom, supra note 7, at 368.
27 See, e.g., Innovative Clusters, supra note 23, at 271 (finding that university research
leads to clustering of innovative activity at early and late stages of industry life cycles);
R&D Spillovers, supra note 23, at 638 (arguing that innovative activities tend to cluster
where knowledge spillovers are high and where new knowledge is important); see also
Lynne G. Zucker et al., Intellectual Capital and the Birth of U.S. Biotechnology Enter-
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cient to explain why Stanford gave rise to Silicon Valley and Harvard
and MIT gave rise to Route 128, while similar phenomena were not
associated with other major universities in the United States or elsewhere (an issue to which we will return in Part II). However, my concern here is not with the formation of a high technology industrial
district, but with its subsequent development.
Assuming appropriate initial conditions, a combination of Mar-

shallian factor market externalities and technological agglomeration
economies can explain the initial phase of a high technology industrial
district. A scientific innovation, likely linked to university-originated
research and development, has the potential for commercialization. A
university community, in turn, provides an initial population of scientifically trained workers to begin the commercialization process,
thereby triggering the skilled worker/employer locational dynamic
that creates an employee-related Marshallian factor market externality. At the same time, a technological agglomeration economy in the
form of knowledge spillover from universities creates the opportunities for the new firm formations that demand skilled workers. 28 But
what influences the subsequent pattern of the district's development?
From this perspective, knowledge spillovers play a critical role.
Start with an industrial district based on a particular set of products.
Because tacit knowledge is critical to taking an innovation from conception to commercialization, the agglomeration economy at the development/commercialization stage is likely to be large, supporting
significant geographical clustering. 29 By contrast, tacit knowledge can
be expected to play a lesser role during later stages in an industry's life
prises 1-3, 8, 11-13 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 4653, 1994)
(arguing that timing and location of birth of biotech enterprises is determined primarily by
presence of intellectual capital, namely prolific "star" scientists).
28 For example, Zucker, Darby, and Brewer provide empirical evidence that "the timing and location of new biotech firms... and new biotech subunits of existing firms ... are
primarily explained by the presence at a particular time and place of scientists who aro
actively contributing to the basic science as represented by publications in major academic
journals." Zucker et al., supra note 27, at 1; see also Neil Bania et al., Universities and the
Startup of New Companies: Can We Generalize From Route 128 and Silicon Valley?, 75
Rev. Econ. & Stat. 761, 765 (1993) (reporting positive relationship between local university
research and firm creation in electrical and electronic equipment industries); Feldman,
supra note 23, at 89 (noting importance of university research and development to measures of regional innovation).
29 See Innovative Clusters, supra note 23, at 254:
[T]he propensity for innovative activity to geographically cluster will tend to
be shaped by the stage of the industry life cycle.... [T]he importance of tacit
knowledge in generating innovative activity shapes the degree to which innovative activity will cluster. And the relative importance of tacit knowledge in
generating innovative activity varies considerably across the various stages of
the industry life cycle.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

June 1999]

HIGH TECHNOLOGY DISTRICTS

cycle. "In the mature stage [of the industry life cycle,] most of the
technical aspects of the product have become standardized, and the
nature of demand is well known. At this point, the cost of transmitting information over geographic space becomes trivial."" The industry's focus becomes standardized production rather than innovation.
Standardization, in turn, combines with the reduced influence of agglomeration economies of knowledge and the centrifugal force of
congestion-the lower wage and land costs available outside the area
because of the impact of clustering on the costs of fixed inputs-to
cause the geographic dispersion of production. Commentators, for example, have described the dispersion of commodity-like semiconductor manufacturing from Silicon Valley to offshore sites as having
followed this pattern.31
The story thus depicts a cyclical model of the development of a
high technology industrial district. University-related scientific discovery gives rise to the tacit knowledge that creates cluster-inducing
Marshallian and technological agglomeration economies, and initial
conditions fix the cluster's physical location. With the product's maturity, the knowledge-based agglomeration economies dissipate, the
value of physical proximity diminishes, and the industrial district diffuses. The question then is whether anything can interrupt this cycle
of density giving way to diffusion.
At this point, the analysis shifts to the impact of knowledge spillovers on the district's capacity for continued innovation-the development of new products that will reset the industry life cycle. Here
the literature stresses the importance of interfirm knowledge spillovers. Suppose research and development in an industrial district
takes place within a large number of firms, the results of which are
then shared among firms through both voluntary and involuntary
knowledge spillovers 3 2 Voluntary spillovers occur through such
mechanisms as joint ventures and cooperative supply relationships in
which a mutual exchange of technology between a customer and supplier takes place. The benefits of such knowledge spillovers then accrue to the suppliers' other customers. Involuntary spillovers occur
through the movement of workers to new employers. Tacit information associated with an employer's technology is embedded in the
human capital of its employees. When an employee changes jobs, that
30 Id. at 259. See also Robin Cowan & Dominique Foray, The Economics of Codification and the Diffusion of Knowledge, 6 Indus. & Corp. Change 595, 604-05 (1997) (discussing process of codification of tacit knowledge).
31 See, e.g., Saxenian, supra note 11, at 93-95 (discussing movement of Silicon Valley's
manufacturing to lower cost locations).
32 See generally sources cited supra note 23.
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tacit information is available to the new employer. Commenting on
involuntary information sharing in Silicon Valley, one of the founders
of Intel pointed to "the mobility of our personnel, which quickly diffuses knowledge of new techniques in design, production, and marketing throughout the industry. ' 33 These knowledge spillovers
supercharge the innovative capacity of the district with renewed agglomeration economies, facilitating the development of new technologies that create a new industrial life cycle.
Economic geography thus tells a coherent story about the pattern
of industrial districts. Agglomeration economies-Marshallian and
technological-fuel the growth of a district whose physical location is
dictated by initial conditions. The spatial attraction among firms is
intense in the early stages of an industry's life cycle when knowledge
spillovers are critical, only to dissipate as successful commercialization
shifts emphasis from innovation to production. But knowledge spillovers between firms through voluntary cooperation and involuntary
employee movement also have the potential to sustain the district's
centripetal force by repeatedly restarting the industrial life cycle
through new innovation-a form of "second-stage" agglomeration
economy. And at this point our discussion of the two features of the
new economic geography comes full circle: the importance of initial
conditions as a determinant of the particular location of an industrial
district reemerges. Just as initial conditions determine where among a
range of alternative locations an industrial district actually arises, so
too do they influence which among competing industrial districts develops a second-stage agglomeration economy and thereby resets its
innovation cycle and overcomes the locational entropy of product cycle maturity. As we will see, the institutional capacity of a high technology industrial district to support knowledge spillover at this critical
second stage, exemplified by the contrasting experiences of Silicon
Valley and Route 128, also appears to depend importantly on historical accident. In the case of Silicon Valley and Route 128, I will argue,
the historical accident is the different character of the two districts'
legal infrastructures.
II
SILICON VALLEY VERSUS RoUTE

128:

ORGANIZATIONAL

AND PERFORMANCE DIFFERENCES

This Part sets up a natural experiment concerning the importance

of the legal infrastructure to the development of high technology industrial districts. The phenomenon that requires explanation is the
33 Robert N. Noyce, Competition and Cooperation-A Prescription for the Eighties,
Res. Mgmt., Mar. 1982, at 13, 14.
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differential performance of Silicon Valley and Route 128. Route 128
began the race well ahead. In 1965, total technology employment in
the Route 128 area was roughly triple that of Silicon Valley.34 By
1975, Silicon Valley employment had increased fivefold, but it had not
quite doubled in Route 128, putting Silicon Valley about fifteen percent ahead in total technology employment 3 5 Between 1975 and
1990, the gap substantially widened. Over this period, Silicon Valley
created three times the number of new technology-related jobs as
Route 128.36 By 1990, Silicon Valley exported twice the amount of

electronic products as Route 128, 37 a comparison that excludes fields
like software and multimedia, in which Silicon Valley's growth has

been strongest. In 1995, Silicon Valley reported the highest gains in
export sales of any metropolitan area in the United States, an increase
of thirty-five percent over 1994; the Boston area, which includes
Route 128, was not in the top five.38 What explains the improvement
in Silicon Valley's performance, and the deterioration of that of Route
128?
Saxenian's careful account of the causes of the performance dif-

ferential reflects the lessons of the new economic geography. Different initial conditions, reflecting the two areas' different histories,
account for the agglomeration and technological economies that originally gave rise to the two high technology industrial districts. However, differing patterns of industrial organization resulted in differing
levels of interfirm knowledge spillovers and, in turn, differing capacities to create the second-stage agglomeration economy that can reset
34 See Saxenian, supra note 11, at 3 fig.1 (charting levels of total technology employment in Silicon Valley and Route 128 from 1959 to 1990).
35 See id.
36 See id. The same pattern appears if only semiconductor and electronic component
jobs are considered. In 1959, Route 128 semiconductor companies employed approximately 27,500 workers, while Silicon Valley companies employed only 10,000. By 1970, the
balance had reversed: Silicon Valley semiconductor companies employed 28,500 workers,
while Route 128 employment had shrunk to 19,500. By 1980, the difference was even more
pronounced, with Silicon Valley employment rising to 64,000, while Route 128 employment
remained flat at 19,000. See id. at 79 fig.2 (giving employment figures for electronic component and semiconductor firms in Silicon Valley and Route 128 from 1959 to 1980).
37 See id. at 2 (stating that Silicon Valley exported electronic products worth more than
$11 billion in 1990, compared to Route 128's exports of $4.6 billion).
38 In 1997, San Jose exported $29.06 billion (ust behind New York, which exported
$29.08 billion). The Boston area came in twelfth with $8.7 billion of exports. See International Trade Admin, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Export Sales of U.S. Metropolitan Areas,
1993-97 (visited Mar. 1, 1999) <http//www.ita.doc.gov/media/tdatapdf.htm>. Measuring
success along a different dimension, it has been reported that the market capitalization of
technology companies in and around Silicon Valley approximately equals that of the entire
French stock market. See Silicon Valley: Introduction, Bus. Wk., Aug. 18, 1997, at 66, 66.
In 1996, Silicon Valley's unemployment was 3.1% and its exports were rising at about 30%
per year. See Louise Kehoe, The Valley's Magic Formula, Fm. Times, Aug. 25, 1997, at 13.
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the district's product life cycle. In this Part, I trace Saxenian's perceptive analysis of the industrial organization of Silicon Valley and Route
128 and how their differences influenced the existence of knowledge
spillovers. In the next section, I take up the issue that Saxenian's account does not explain: why Silicon Valley developed the knowledgebased second-stage agglomeration economy that allowed the district
to transcend its original product life cycle. Put differently, what initial
conditions caused the second-round agglomeration economy to develop in Silicon Valley and not in Route 128?
A. District Origins
Both Route 128 and Silicon Valley had their origins in local universities. But while the Harvard/MIT complex for Route 128 and
Stanford University for Silicon Valley provided the core around which
each district grew, different events triggered the emergence of the industrial districts in these particular localities around these particular
universities.
For Route 128, the critical event was the increase in defense
spending on technology during World War II and the Cold War. MIT
received more military funding during World War II than any other
university, in no small measure due to the presence of an MIT professor, Vannevar Bush, as head of the government funding agency. 39
This funding led to MIT's creation of the Radiation Laboratory. 40
Similarly, Air Force funding during the early Cold War period led to
the formation of Lincoln Lab at MIT in 1951.41 By the mid-1960s,
Boston area university-related research labs employed some 5000
scientists and engineers. 42 Consistent with the existence of agglomeration economies resulting from the concentration of skilled engineers,
the area proved a fertile ground for commercial technology development. Lincoln Lab scientists founded more than fifty companies, including DEC, and scientists from the MIT Instrumentation Lab
founded another fifty-five. 43
Like Route 128, Silicon Valley took its modern shape after World
War II.44 While Hewlett-Packard and Litton Engineering Laboratories had formed in the 1930s, the initial conditions associated with
39 See Saxenian, supra note 11, at 13.
40 See id. at 14.
41 See id. at 16.
42 See id.
43 See Susan Rosegrant & David R. Lampe, Route 128: Lessons from Boston's HighTech Community 93, 99 (1992).
44 This account draws on Saxenian, supra note 11, at 20-24, and Stuart W. Leslie &
Robert H. Kargon, Selling Silicon Valley: Frederick Terman's Model for Regional Advantage, 70 Bus. Hist. Rev. 435, 435-42 (1996).
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Silicon Valley's emergence lay in the efforts of Frederick Terman, an
MIT Ph.D. and prewar Stanford engineering professor, who became
Stanford's dean of engineering following World War I. 45 Having
been both a student of Vannevar Bush at MIT and director of
Harvard's Radio Research Lab during World War II, Terman saw
firsthand the potential benefits of university-industry collaboration.
He returned to Stanford after World War II and pioneered Stanford's
efforts to develop the agglomeration economies necessary to establish
a high technology industrial district. He increased the size of the Stanford engineering program-by 1950, its award of doctoral degrees in
electrical engineering equaled that of MIT-and led efforts to expand
the range of university-industry knowledge spillovers. Stanford
founded the Stanford Research Institute explicitly as a bridge between
university research and commercial application. Stanford also initiated its Honors Cooperative Program, which encouraged engineers at
local companies to enroll in graduate programs at the university,
thereby formalizing university-company interaction. Finally, Stanford
turned some of its own land adjacent to the campus into the Stanford
Industrial Park, which assured that physical proximity would reinforce
ties between the university and the electronics community. By 1961,
46
the industrial park housed twenty-five companies on over 652 acres.
Thus, Marshallian factor market externalities and technological
economies combined to support the growth of Route 128 and Silicon
Valley as high technology industrial districts. The initial conditions
that favored those universities and localities were different, with
World War II federal research funds providing the trigger for
Harvard/MIT and Route 128, and the efforts of Frederick Terman, in
part shaped by his own experience in Boston, acting as the spur to
Stanford and Silicon Valley.47
B. Subsequent Development
Saxenian's account of the differential performance of Silicon Valley and Route 128 centers on the strikingly different forms of industrial organization that came to characterize the two regions. From the
45 Prior to World War II, Terman had helped David Packard and William Hewlett, both
then his students, found Hewlett-Packard by providing advice and a small personal investment. The garage on Addison Avenue in Palo Alto where the two graduate students
worked has been designated by the State of California as "the birthplace of Silicon Valley."
Leslie & Kargon, supra note 44, at 436, 442.
46 See Saxenian, supra note 11, at 23-24.
47 Leslie and Kargon note that just as Route 128 benefited from world War II defense
expenditures in its early years, so too did Silicon Valley benefit from Cold War defense

spending. See Leslie & Kargon, supra note 44, at 470; see also Ann Markusen et al., The
Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of Industrial America 3,5 (1991) (stressing
importance of defense spending for U.S. high technology districts).
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outset, Silicon Valley developed a business structure that reflected
nonlinear career patterns and a special status for entrepreneurs. The
career paths of Silicon Valley engineers and managers resembled
Brownian motion. They moved between companies, founded startups, supplied former employers, purchased from former employees,
and in the course of their careers developed personal and professional
relationships that cut across companies and competition. During the
1970s, employee turnover averaged more than thirty-five percent a
year at the region's electronics firms; 48 even in the severe recession in
the semiconductor industry in 1984, twelve percent of a sample of
Silicon Valley electronics production engineers quit their existing jobs
for different employers. 49 As Saxenian characterized the environment
in Silicon Valley, "engineers shifted between firms so frequently that
mobility not only was socially acceptable, it became the norm." o
Entrepreneurs occupy a special place in the Silicon Valley hierarchy. 51 As Joseph Bankman and I have written elsewhere,
[i]n Silicon Valley, the defining myth takes as its stage David
Packard's or Steve Jobs' garage. Palo Alto's Roland is the engineer
who, with nothing but an idea and strength of character, leaves his
job with an established company, starts a firm that becomes an in52
dustry leader, and in the process becomes fabulously wealthy.

Literally scores of companies, including most prominently Intel, trace
their origins to a founder's prior employment at Fairchild Semicon48 See Saxenian, supra note 11, at 34. Almeida and Kogut trace the employment pattern of engineers in the semiconductor industry who have secured patents on their research. They report that "Silicon Valley is clearly unique in terms of inter-firm mobility."
Paul Almeida & Bruce Kogut, Localization of Knowledge and the Mobility of Engineers in
Regional Networks 16 (Aug. 5, 1998) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
49 See David P. Angel, The Labor Market for Engineers in the U.S. Semiconductor
Industry, 65 Econ. Geography 99, 103 (1989) (concluding that results of survey "indicate
substantial labor mobility among semiconductor production engineers and confirm the expectation of frequent job changing by these highly skilled workers").
50 Saxenian, supra note 11, at 34. One engineer told Saxenian, "Two or three years is
about max (at a job) for the Valley because there's always something more interesting
across the street. You don't see someone staying twenty years at a job here." Id. at 35.
The comment of another engineer captures the absence of friction in moving between jobs
associated with a Marshallian factor market externality:
[In Silicon Valley] it wasn't that big a catastrophe to quit your job on Friday
and have another job on Monday and this was just as true for company executives. You didn't necessarily even have to tell your wife. You just drove off in
another direction on Monday morning. You didn't have to sell your house,
and your kids didn't have to change schools.
Id.
51 Saxenian reports that "[tihe culture of the Valley accorded the highest regard to
those who started firms." Id. at 38.
52 Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-ups?, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 289, 289-90
(1999).
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ductor, which itself was formed by engineers leaving Shockley Transistor Corporation. As Saxenian notes, former Hewlett-Packard
53
executives alone founded eighteen start-ups between 1974 and 1984.
The result of what Alan Hyde calls a "high velocity labor market"54 -rapid employee movement both between employers and in
connection with founding start-ups-is a pattern of industrial organization in which firms are remarkably porous to outside influence.
Firms have not vertically integrated because smaller start-ups could
provide parts more cheaply and effectively. In turn, the availability of
a full range of suppliers reduces the capital necessary to found a startup; virtually everything but the idea can be subcontracted out.55
Moreover, even vertical integration could not effectively protect a
company's trade secrets; too many employees would move to competitors carrying their employer's know-how with them (while the employer in turn would benefit from an inflow of employees from other
employers).
Thus, Silicon Valley's form of industrial organization institutionalized the knowledge spillovers that constitute the second-stage agglomeration economy critical to resetting an industrial district's
production life cycle. With this local industry structure, a single company need not be a technological leader in every stage of a product's
manufacturing process. Instead it can specialize in one stage, whether
research and design or fabrication, and rely on suppliers or customers
to provide cutting edge technology at other stages. In Saxenian's account, knowledge spillovers facilitated by the mobility of employees
and the resulting bias against vertical integration turn the entire industrial district into an engine of continuous innovation, thereby transcending the life cycle of any single product.
Route 128 firms, in contrast, developed in more traditional fashion, imitating the vertically integrated structures of the large massproduction company.5 6 In contrast to the Brownian motion of Silicon
Valley's high velocity employment, career patterns of employers and
managers in Route 128 companies were much more linear. Knowledge workers anticipated long-term employment with a single employer and career development that contemplated rising vertically
53 See Saxenian, supra note 11, at 116. Silicon Valley's fascination with start-ups also
has efficiency advantages. A large literature suggests that the small companies are more

likely sources of innovation. See Bankman & Gilson, supra note 52, at 299-302 (surveying
literature).
54 Hyde, supra note 9, at 3.
55 See Saxenian, supra note 11, at 40 (noting that "hundreds of small design firms, contract manufacturers, metalworking shops, software developers, and prototyping operations

made their homes in Silicon Valley," facilitating growth of start-ups).
56

See id. at 70.
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within an organization, rather than success through lateral movement,
as in Silicon Valley. 57 As Saxenian emphasizes, "[tihe practice of leaving a large company to join a small firm or a promising new start-up
was virtually unheard of."'58 Consistent with this pattern, Route 128
gave rise to traditionally vertically integrated companies; in this locality, knowledge transfer took place within, rather than across firms.59
As a result, learning and innovation were company-specific exercises.
Missing was the knowledge spillover and the corresponding secondstage agglomeration economy associated with information dissemination through employee mobility and the absence of vertical integration. To be sure, particular companies in Route 128 created
innovative products, but the performance of the district as a whole
deteriorated. The district was unable to reset the product life cycle
consistently, with a resulting decline across the region.
C. Explanationsfor the Organizationaland Performance Differentials
Saxenian's account provides three-quarters of the elements necessary to explain the origins and different trajectories of the Silicon
Valley and Route 128 high technology districts. Consistent with the
new economic geography, a complete story must account for four elements: (i) the initial conditions and (ii) associated agglomeration
economies that explain both the location and original success of the
two districts, and (iii) the initial conditions and (iv) associated secondstage agglomeration economy whose presence has allowed Silicon Valley to reset its product life cycle and whose absence has contributed to
Route 128's decline. The story so far explains the initial conditions
and agglomeration economies that gave rise to Silicon Valley and
Route 128, and the agglomeration economy present in Silicon Valley
and absent in Route 128 that allowed Silicon Valley to recreate the
district continually. What is missing is item (iv): an account of the
initial conditions whose presence facilitated the second-stage agglomeration economy in Silicon Valley and whose absence hindered its development in Route 128.
57 See Almeida & Kogut, supra note 48, at 30 tbl.5 (reporting that patent-holding
Silicon Valley engineers in semiconductor industry change jobs within that region eight
times more frequently than do similar engineers in Route 128 region).
58 Saxenian, supra note 11, at 63. The differential in the founding of start-ups is startling. According to Saxenian, the largest wave of start-ups in Silicon Valley history began
in the late 1970s and continued during the 1980s. See id. at 117. During the same period,
the rate of start-ups in Route 128 declined. See id. at 125. In 1981, for example, venture
capitalists funded only 17 start-ups in Massachusetts, while funding 37 in Silicon Valley.
See id. at 64.
59 See id. at 69-70 (describing development of vertically integrated "self-sufficient"
firms in Route 128 region).
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Saxenian's tale of two districts does reveal the basic mechanism
whose differential availability must be explained. The second-stage
agglomeration economy results from intercompany, intradistrict
knowledge spillovers that cause the entire district to function as an
innovation laboratory. These spillovers result from the pattern of extreme employee mobility characteristic of Silicon Valley and absent in
Route 128. The web of knowledge spillovers, personal relations, startup businesses, and absence of vertical integration owes its existence to
the ease with which employees move from employer to employer,
from established company to start-up, from customer to supplier, taking their employer's tacit knowledge with them and applying it in their
new situations. Lacking the ability to prevent knowledge spillovers,
Silicon Valley companies adapted to their environment, and the characteristic Silicon Valley industrial organization evolved.6° But that
leaves us with the missing item: Why did high velocity employment
evolve in Silicon Valley and not in Route 128? What were the initial
conditions associated with the second-stage agglomeration economy?
Saxenian offers a partial but, in the end, incomplete answer: culture or "social structure."' 61 In Silicon Valley the absence of a prior
culture allowed the development of a new one-one which reinforced
open social and professional relations. These open relations also
"functioned as efficient job search networks," 62 critically important in
a culture in which "[t]he preferred career option... was to join a
small company or a start-up, rather than an established company. The
became
superiority of small, innovative firms over large corporations
63
engineers.1
region's
the
of
many
among
faith
an article of
The culture in Route 128 differed. "The conservative social traditions and attitudes of New England also shaped the organization of
The story is one in which initial conditions lead to the adoption of complementary
institutions-those that make existing institutions more productive. Development of the
system thus moves in a domino-like fashion as existing institutions give rise to associated
institutions that provide this fit. See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Complementarities
and Fit: Strategy, Structure, and Organizational Change, 19 J. Acct. & Econ. 179, 180, 190
(1995) (using complementarity theory to suggest that effective firm structures change to
optimize fit with environment); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Complementarities and
Systems: Understanding Japanese Economic Organization, 9 Estudios Econ6micos 3, 4
(1994) (using complementarity theory to interpret characteristic features of Japanese economic organization as being particularly well adapted to Japan); Paul Milgrom & John
Roberts, The Economics of Modem Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 511,526-27 (1990) (concluding that clustering of high-tech firms is
result of exploitation of complementarities that simultaneously increase manufacturing
quality and decrease production costs).
61 Saxenian, supra note 11, at 29. See also id. at 2-4 (arguing that Silicon Valley's less
formal social and business structures explain its success relative to Route 128).
62 Id. at 34.
60

63 Id.
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local labor markets and patterns of entrepreneurship. Stability and
company loyalty were valued over experimentation and risk-taking in
the Route 128 region." 64 Thus, in Saxenian's account, cultural differences in the two regions provide the crucial initial conditions that led
to different employment patterns and, ultimately, to different patterns
of industrial organization only one of which-Silicon Valley's-would
produce a second-stage agglomeration economy.
But why did Silicon Valley culture develop differently from
Route 128? Accepting Saxenian's description of the two districts, her
proffer of culture as the causal agent of the critical differences in employee career patterns ultimately is unpersuasive. Standing alone, cultural explanations are incomplete accounts of the characteristics of
economic institutions. It is hardly surprising that culture and economically successful institutions are mutually supportive; the intriguing result would be if the two conflicted. But the correspondence between
culture and economics leaves open the question of causation,65 a matter of great importance if part of the goal is to understand the structure necessary to support a high technology district.
The new economic geography and Saxenian's description of
Silicon Valley and Route 128 thus combine to leave us with a critical
question: What initial conditions gave rise to the regions' critically
different employment patterns? As Paul Krugman puts it, "given a
slightly different sequence of events, Silicon Valley might have been in
Los Angeles, Massachusetts, or even Oxfordshire. ' '66 And that brings
us to the influence of the legal infrastructure.
III
THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY
INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS

In Part II's account of the second-stage agglomeration economy
whose presence explains Silicon Valley's capacity to reset the district's

product cycle, employee mobility plays the central role. Much of a
high technology firm's intellectual property is informal in character,
embedded in the human capital of its employees. As Robert Merges
has explained:
64 Id. at 62.
65 See Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the
Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1999)
(manuscript at 6, on file with the New York University Law Review) (arguing that "hindsight can give the illusion of causation" but, without more, "random sequencing and tight
causation are equally compelling").
66 Paul Krugman, Complex Landscapes in Economic Geography, 84 Am. Econ. Rev.
412, 415 (1994).
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A great deal of the relevant information is in the form of trade
secrets or "tacit" knowledge and know-how.... Accounts of industrial R&D and invention almost universally mention the importance
of hands-on experience, much of it gained over time and in the
course of interactions with other researchers, manufacturing personnel, and marketing experts in the firm.67

This element of the employer's intellectual property is embedded in
the employee's human capital, and can be most effectively transferred
through proximity and, in particular, by an employee changing jobs.
Thus, employee mobility is the mechanism by which the requisite
knowledge spillover occurs. But an individual employer has an obvious competitive interest in protecting its intellectual capital which, in
the case of trade secrets and tacit knowledge, is accomplished by restricting employee mobility. Individually rational employer efforts to
protect intellectual property ultimately conflict with the collectively
rational conditions necessary to the knowledge spillovers that support
the second-stage agglomeration economy.
The legal infrastructure of a high technology industrial district
mediates this tension between intellectual property protection on the
one hand, and employee mobility on the other. This Part describes
the complementary legal rules that both determine the character of
intellectual property rights and shape the terms of the employment
relation. Demonstrating how the California and Massachusetts rules
differ in these two critical respects is the first step toward identifying
differences in the districts' legal infrastructures and highlighting an
important initial condition that ultimately helped shape their
experiences.
I should take up at the outset a straightforward response to the
importance this account accords the aspects of the legal infrastructure
bearing on employee mobility. If encouraging interemployer spillovers of trade secrets and tacit knowledge through employee mobility
results in a second-stage agglomeration economy, and if the average
per farm value of that economy exceeds the corresponding average per
firm cost of weakened intellectual property protection, then the legal
infrastructure should be irrelevant. Individual firms acting in their
own self-interest will elect not to interfere with employee mobility,
resulting in a self-enforcing equilibrium of high velocity
employment. 68
Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and Employee Inventions in Corporate
Governance Today 19 (Apr. 28, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York
University Law Review).
6S I have in mind here Robert Ellickson's study of the difference between the rules
actually applied by the community and the law on the books in resolving cattle disputes in
67
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The difficulty with this account of self-organization is the familiar
coordination barrier to collective action. While it would be in the interest of the region's firms collectively to facilitate employee mobility
even at the expense of diluting the intellectual property of individual
firms, it will be in the interest of any individual firm to impede the
mobility of its own employees. Such a firm gets the benefit of the
region-wide spillover of other firms' intellectual property without incurring the cost of diluting its own. Some coordinating mechanism is
necessary to achieve (and perhaps maintain) the equilibrium, which
brings us back to the role of the legal infrastructure. 69 Whether because Silicon Valley firms did not realize the regional advantages from
employee mobility, or because of the difficulty of coordination, local
firms' initial response to employee mobility reflected an individually
rational strategy. As Saxenian describes, early in the district's development employers responded to departing employees by taking legal
action. Only the failure of these efforts led to employer acceptance of
70
high velocity employment.
Our inquiry thus starts with the ability of Silicon Valley firms to
prevent knowledge spillovers through employee mobility. As we will
see, the regime of high velocity employment appears to have resulted
from the legal infrastructure's failure to provide complete protection
for an important category of intellectual property. The inability to
Shasta County, California. Residents developed and applied their own rules independent
of the formal legal infrastructure. See Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How
Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991).
69 Professor Roe and I consider a similar claim with respect to the absence of an external labor market associated with Japanese lifetime employment. Our analysis suggests,
consistent with the text, that individual firm self-interest will prevent the evolution of a
self-enforcing equilibrium. See Gilson & Roe, supra note 65, at 2. We conclude that establishing the equilibrium observed over most of the post-World War II period in Japan required government coordination. See id. at 15-16. Robert Bone nicely demonstrates the
difficulty of reaching a coordination outcome by means of a Rawlsian behind-the-veil analysis. See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 241, 291-92 (1998).
70 See Saxenian, supra note 11, at 35. Indeed, occasional outbursts of employer hostility to employee mobility continue to occur. According to accounts in advertisements taken
out by Oracle Corporation in the San Francisco Chronicle and on billboards along U.S. 101
(which runs by Oracle headquarters), 11 computer programmers at Informix, an Oracle
competitor, left Informix and joined Oracle in January 1997. See Advertisement, "They
are treating us like runaway slaves.", S.F. Examiner, Mar. 9, 1997, at B7. According to the
Oracle advertisement, the day the employees quit, the CEO of Informix confronted the
CEO of Oracle at his home, asking Oracle "to return the eleven 'runaway' employees." Id.
The next day, Informix sued each of the departing employees. See id. Oracle appeared to
be taking some pleasure in the event, with the advertisement offering the following advice
to various interested parties: "Advice to Informix: Hire programmers not lawyers...
Advice to Informix programmers: Negotiate your legal fees upfront. Advice to Informix
customers: Call Oracle." Id.
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prevent knowledge spillovers through employee mobility proved to be
one pole around which Silicon Valley's business culture and industrial
organization precipitated.
A.

Protecting Tacit Knowledge and Inventions Through Trade
Secret and Invention Law

1.

Tacit Knowledge

Trade secret law provides the most straightforward source of protection for an employer's tacit knowledge that has become embedded
in an employee's human capital. Stated generally, employees retain
the right to use their general and industry-specific human capital when
they move to a new position. However, they cannot make use of an
employer's trade secrets; conceptually, at least, employers have the
right to prevent employees from "spilling over" tacit knowledge that
constitutes a trade secret. If the employer can prove that the new
employer of a former employee has used its trade secrets, a variety of
remedies are available, including injunctive relief and damages. The
problem, however, is that trade secret law provides less effective protection than may at first appear.
The line between the employee's general and industry-specific
knowledge on the one hand, and the employer's trade secrets on the
other, is drawn by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTA), 7 1which has
been adopted in one form or another by the majority of jurisdictions
(including California).72 The UTA defines a trade secret as:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,
and (ii) is the subject of efforts that3 are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy_2
71 Unif. Trade Secrets Act (amended 1985), 14 U.LA. 437 (1990 & Supp. 1998).

72 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 statutory note at 437-38 (listing
states adopting Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTA) or other civil trade secret statute of
general applicability). In addition to the District of Columbia, the following states have
adopted the UTA or other trade secret statutes: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
73 Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.LA. 437-38 (West 1990). The

California statute differs from the UTA in that it omits from clause (i) the phrase "and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means." See Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1 (West 1997).
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While Massachusetts has not adopted the UTA, 74 its common law definition of a trade secret is for practical purposes identical. 75
The definition establishes the elements of the cause of action for

misappropriation of a trade secret-the mechanism by which an employer would protect its tacit knowledge from spilling over to a competitor by means of an employee's departure. The original employer
would have to show that the former employee's new employer "misappropriated" 76 information of the original employer, that the information was not generally known, and that the original employer had
made reasonable efforts to protect the information's secrecy. From

the perspective of an original employer seeking to protect competitively sensitive tacit knowledge, two problems are readily apparent.
The first is substantive, the second procedural.
This omission has the effect of providing broader protection than the UTA, a point I will
consider below, see infra text accompanying notes 101-03.
74 See Roger M. Milgrim, 1 Milgrim on Trade Secrets § 1.01[2][b] (1998) [hereinafter
Milgrim on Trade Secrets].
75 See, e.g., CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 850 (1st Cir. 1985) (defining trade
secret as "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who
do not know or use it" (internal quotations omitted in original) (quoting Eastern Marble
Prods. Corp. v. Roman Marble, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Mass. 1977) (quoting Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. b (1939)))). The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition defines a trade secret as "any information that can be used in the operation of a
business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual
or potential economic advantage over others." Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 (1995). The reporters state with respect to section 39 that "[tihe concept of a
trade secret as defined in this Section is intended to be consistent with the definition of
'trade secret' in § 1(4) of the [UTA]." Id. § 39 cmt. b.
76 Section 1 of the UTA defines "misappropriation" as:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has
reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied
consent by a person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his
knowledge of the trade secret was
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper
means to acquire it;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain
its secrecy or limit its use; or
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or had reason
to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(2) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (West 1990). For the Massachusetts statute codifying the tort action available for trade secret infringement, see
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93, § 42 (1997).
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The substantive problem relates to the imprecision of the lines
that the UTA requires a litigant to establish. The distinction between
tacit knowledge embedded in the employee's human capital that "derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known," and an employee's general or industry-specific
human capital is blurred at very best. Similarly uncertain are what
efforts to maintain secrecy are "reasonable under the circumstances,"
and therefore required by the UTA as a condition to trade secret protection. Articles by California practitioners provide a lengthy litany of
protective activities that would help establish the requisite effort to
maintain secrecy, 7 but all are expensive and some are likely to interfere with the actual conduct of the business. This latter point is especially important. When lawyers design procedures that are
inconvenient for those who actually must implement them, the procedures tend to be ignored. From an evidentiary standpoint, adopting
and then ignoring a procedure is more damaging than never having
adopted it at all, since the adoption undermines the argument that the
procedure was unnecessary in the first place. Finally, the matter remains a judgment call for the trier of fact.
The procedural problem derives from the substantive problem.
Precisely because the distinctions the UTA requires a plaintiff to establish are imprecise, trade secret litigation is likely to be expensive
and slow. The frequency with which phrases like "knows [knew] or
has [had] reason to know" or "reasonable under the circumstances"
appear in the statute is a fair metric for the breadth of discovery by
the defendant. 78 Moreover, it is quite unlikely that such issues will be
resolvable by summary judgment.79 In every case, the plaintiff will
77 See, e.g., Victoria A. Cundiff, Protecting Computer Software as a Trade Secret (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G44042,1998); Marina C. Tsatalis & Timothy Klima, Protecting Trade Secrets from Malicious
Employees, in Legal Documentation for Start-up and Emerging Companies 1 (Education

Comm. of the Bus. Law Section, State Bar of California, 1997) (describing requirement
that "reasonable efforts" must be made to maintain secrecy); Gary E. Weiss et al., Protecting Trade Secrets: A Primer for California Start-ups, in Legal Documentation for Start-up

and Emerging Companies, supra, at 5-6 (listing items to consider in order to achieve "reasonable efforts" to protect trade secrets, including manuals, confidential stamps, posted
warnings, security guards, key-lock entries, encryption, document shredding policies, and
logs of persons requesting sensitive information).
78 See supra note 76 (setting out statutory definition of misappropriation).
79 Judge Posner said with respect to the original employer's obligation to maintain
secrecy.

But only in an extreme case can what is a "reasonable" precaution be determined on a motion for summary judgment, because the answer depends on a
balancing of costs and benefits that will vary from case to case and so require
estimation and measurement by persons knowledgeable in the particular field
of endeavor involved.... There are contested factual issues here, bearing in
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have to take seriously the threat that the matter will actually have to
be tried, with the resulting uncertainty associated with a jury trial on
technical issues.80
In short, litigation seeking to protect an employer's trade secrets
from spilling over by a former employee's taking with her the employer's tacit knowledge has two important characteristics that are
amusingly (albeit distressingly) highlighted in tongue-in-cheek quips
that I have heard from commercial litigators. The first has counsel for
a potential trade secret plaintiff advising her client that "no price is
too high for justice." In contrast, the second has counsel for the potential defendant advising her client that "justice delayed is justice."
On balance, trade secret law does not seem to provide a significant
barrier to high velocity employment and, at least in California, it apparently has not.
Care must be taken not to overstate the argument. Trade secret
law does have force. Actions in response to theft and industrial espionage, because they are unlikely to involve tacit knowledge, are not
subject to the same level of ambiguity associated with efforts to restrict employee mobility. And significant protection is provided even
against departing employees in circumstances where the misappropriation is clear (as when the former employee has removed or copied
documents), the technology obviously secret, and the damage to the
business substantial. 81 But it remains the case that protection is limited with respect to the kind of knowledge spillovers that give rise to a
second-stage agglomeration economy. In this regard, one should keep
in mind that the practical considerations weighing against employee
litigation will grow with the development of the industrial district, thus
mind that what is reasonable is itself a fact for purposes of Rule 56 of the civil
rules.
Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179-80 (7th Cir. 1991). Note
also that Judge Posner's reference to "estimation and measurement by persons knowledgeable in the particular field" can be fairly read to invite a contest of expensive experts and a
parallel round of expert discovery.
80 A third concern involves the danger that the litigation process itself will result in the
disclosure of the trade secret to third parties whose subsequent use of the trade secret will
not violate the UTA because the third party will not have "misappropriated" the information. In California, for example, Civil Procedure Code section 2019 requires that "the
party alleging the misappropriation shall identify the trade secret with reasonable particularity." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2019(d) (West 1998). To be sure, in any action under the
UTA the court is directed to "preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable
means." Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.5 (West 1997). However, the practical difficulty of adequately policing the large number of third parties who will come to know the trade secret
as a result of contested litigation, even with the assistance of various protective orders,
represents a significant deterrent to commencing the litigation in the first place.
81 In addition to state criminal law, the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 imposes federal criminal penalties for trade secret theft. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (Supp. 111996).
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continually raising the value threshold that must be crossed before it
will be worthwhile to initiate trade secret litigation against a former
employee. In my analysis, the absence of legal barriers to high velocity employment provides the pole around which a complementary
business culture precipitates. Once a business culture supportive of
high velocity employment is established, trade secret litigation against
former employees is not only expensive and uncertain, but also risks
the imposition of labor market-imposed reputation penalties against
the unusual employer who sues a departing employee. Hyde provides
examples of this phenomenon;8 the recent Oracle-Informix controversy provides yet another.83 Thus, as the high technology industrial
district takes form, the costs of a former employer pursuing trade secret litigation against departing employees rise. Given the initial conditions, local employment practices evolve toward a self-enforcing
equilibrium.
2. Inventions
Legal rules provide the employer little more comfort when an
employee leaves with a new invention to form a start-up than they do
when an employee leaves with tacit knowledge to work for a competitor. Who owns an invention discovered by an employee depends on
the stage of the inventive process at which the question is asked. The
critical point in the process is "conception," defined as "the first occurrence of the complete invention in the mind of the inventor-as
corroborated by objective evidence."8 Under the law of inventions,
ideas remain the employee's property until conception. And because
conception requires the employee to take the affirmative step of creating written corroboration, an employee can choose to delay this event
until after he leaves the company. ss
To-be sure, the earlier in the invention process an employee must
make the decision to undertake a start-up, the riskier is the employee's human capital investment in the venture.86 However, it is
important to stress that the litigation burden of proving conception
82 See Hyde, supra note 9, at 137-40 (describing "reputational sanctions" imposed on
IBM and Intel after they sued departing employees).
83 The Oracle-Informix incident is recounted supra note 70.
84 Merges, supra note 67, at 37 (emphasis added).
85 See id. at 37-38. For present purposes, we can ignore statutory and common law
differences in the default rules regarding invention ownership that depend on whether the
employee was hired to do research, whether the inventing employee used employer resources in the invention process, and whether the invention related to the employer's existing or contemplated business. As long as the employee leaves before the invention's
formal conception, the ownership rules influenced by these considerations do not apply.
86

See Bankman & Gilson, supra note 52, at 306 n.44.
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rests with the former employer who is claiming ownership. Thus, the
former employer will have to acquire through discovery precisely the
documents that a legally sophisticated Silicon Valley employee knows
would be damaging. This knowledge allows the former employee to
behave strategically with respect to such documents, by not turning
over documents that he has made, by not retaining them, or by not
creating them in the first place.
That leaves the application of trade secret law to preconception
inventions. Here too, however, protection fails. Merges states with
respect to this concern that "while trade secret law protects pure information in theory, in practice trade secret actions by ex-employers
are rarely successful where the former employee(s) take nothing tangible with them. '87
B. Protecting Tacit Knowledge and Inventions Through a Covenant
Not to Compete
Were trade secret law the only way to protect employers against
spillovers of proprietary knowledge through employee mobility, the
legal infrastructure would be an unlikely candidate to explain the initial conditions that led to the different experiences of Silicon Valley
and Route 128. Simply put, the legal infrastructures of the two districts do not differ in material respects along this dimension: The
scope of protection provided by trade secret law in California and
Massachusetts appears to be roughly the same.
Employers, however, have recourse to another, more effective
way to prevent employee-disseminated spillovers of employer proprietary knowledge. If the critical mechanism by which spillovers occur
is employee mobility, then an employer could secure protection by
causing employees to sign postemployment covenants not to compete.
In contrast to trade secret law, the legal infrastructures of Silicon Valley and Route 128 differ dramatically along this dimension.
1. The Operation of Covenants Not to Compete
A postemployment covenant not to compete prevents knowledge
spillover of an employer's proprietary knowledge not, as does trade
secret law, by prohibiting its disclosure or use, but by blocking the
mechanism by which the spillover occurs: employees leaving to take
up employment with a competitor or to form a competing start-up.
Such a covenant provides that, after the termination of employment
for any reason, the employee will not compete with the employer in
the employer's existing or contemplated businesses for a designated
87

Merges, supra note 67, at 38.
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period of time-typically one to two years-in a specified geographical region that corresponds to the market in which the employer
participates.
The effectiveness of such provisions reflects the limited useful life
of knowledge in high technology industries. Given the speed of innovation and the corresponding telescoping of product life cycles, knowledge more than a year or two old likely no longer has significant
competitive value. The hiatus imposed by a covenant not to compete
thus assures that a departing employee will bring to a new employer
only her general and industry-specific human capital. The value of
proprietary tacit knowledge embedded in the employee's human capital, or the value of inchoate inventions the employee has strategically
chosen not to bring to conception during her employment, will have
dissipated over the covenant's term. Nothing of value is left to spill
over to a new employer or start-up venture.
The availability of such a covenant has an obvious impact on the
potential for an industrial district to develop a second-stage agglomeration economy like the one that has allowed Silicon Valley to reset its
product cycle. The covenant puts a sharp brake on employee mobility, and thus on the knowledge spillovers that give rise to the critical
second-stage agglomeration economy. The widespread use and enforcement of covenants not to compete slow down high velocity employment to the point where the level of knowledge spillovers is too
low to support a districtwide innovation cycle.
It is with respect to the availability of covenants not to compete
that the character of the legal infrastructure helps explain the initial
conditions that gave rise to the different experiences of Silicon Valley
and Route 128. Under Massachusetts law, postemployment covenants
not to compete generally are enforceable. Under California law, they
are not. As we will see, this difference in starting points helps explain
the different capacities of the two industrial districts to generate the
second-stage agglomeration economy necessary to reset a district's
product cycle.
2. The Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete
Under Massachusetts Law
Massachusetts law is generally representative of the approach
taken toward postemployment covenants not to compete by the great
majority of states. United States law in this area largely derives from
English law that developed the basic pattern of blanket enforcement
of covenants not to compete given by the seller in connection with the
sale of a business, and the application of a rule of reason to covenants
associated with employment. Covenants not to compete would be en-
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forced against a departing employee if the covenant's duration and
geographic coverage were no greater than necessary to protect an employer's legitimate business interest, and not otherwise contrary to the
public interest.88 This formulation is commonplace in Massachusetts
covenant cases, 8 9 and dates to the late nineteenth century.90
88 See generally Anthony C. Valiulis, Covenants Not to Compete 166-68 (1985); Harlan
M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 629-51 (1960).
As related by Valiulis, the development of English law regarding enforceability of postemployment covenants not to compete tells an interesting tale of economic history. The earliest statutes and caselaw, quite hostile to employment restrictions, are said to have grown
out of the extreme labor shortage following the Black Death in 1348. See Valiulis, supra,
at 155-57. In 1349, for example, the Ordinance of Labourers was enacted which, in effect,
made voluntary unemployment a crime. See id. at 156-57. Dyer's Case denied enforcement of a bond against competition by a former employee, with the comment by one of the
judges that "[b]y God, if the plaintiff were here he should go to prison until he paid a fine
to the King." Blake, supra, at 636 & n.33 (quoting Dyer's Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. 5, 5, Mich. 26
(C.P. 1414)). Changing economic circumstances, including the rise and decline of the
guilds, led to the development of a rule of reason. See Valiulis, supra, at 157-65.
The general approach in the United States is set out in Restatement (Second) of
Contracts:
(1) A promise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in restraint of trade if
(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee's legitimate interest, or
(b) the promisee's need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor
and the likely injury to the public.
(2) Promises imposing restraints that are ancillary to a valid transaction or
relationship include...

(b) a promise by an employee or other agent not to compete with his employer or other principal ....
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 (1981).
89 See, e.g., Edgecomb v. Edmonston, 153 N.E. 99, 101-02 (Mass. 1926) (enjoining defendant, pursuant to covenant, from engaging in any line of business similar to plaintiff's
within city of Boston, and from soliciting plaintiff's customers within Massachusetts for
period of five years); Quincy Oil Co. v. Sylvester, 130 N.E. 217,218 (Mass. 1921) (applying
rule of reason analysis, considering contract in light of business, situation of parties, circumstances under which contract was made, and scope and purpose of contract); Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 968 F.2d 1463, 1468-69 (1st Cir.
1992) (interpreting Massachusetts law as permitting restrictive covenant so long as it was
necessary for protection of employer, reasonably limited in time and space, and consonant
with public interest); Allied Adjustment Serv. v. Heney, 484 A.2d 1189, 1191 (N.H. 1984)
(interpreting Massachusetts law as permitting "reasonable" covenants not to compete).
Massachusetts law is flexible in that a court will trim down, to the point that it is
enforceable, an otherwise valid covenant whose duration or geographic coverage is too
great. See, e.g., All Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 308 N.E.2d 481, 485-86 (Mass. 1974) (upholding two-year covenant not to compete but restricting geographical area to territory serviced by salesman prior to termination).
90 Blake, supra note 88, at 644, dates the rule of reason formulation in Massachusetts to
Morse Twist Drill & Mach. Co. v. Morse, 103 Mass. 73 (1869) (upholding covenant not to
compete based on nature of business, scope and purpose of covenant, and circumstances
under which covenant was made).
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Massachusetts caselaw developing the circumstances when a covenant not to compete will be enforceable is large, somewhat inconsistent, and uses the language of trade secret law quite loosely. In
particular, judicial discussion of the interests of an employer sufficient
to support enforcement typically refers to a litany of acceptable concerns: the protection of trade secrets, confidential information, and
goodwill. 91 This formulation raises the possibility that a covenant not

to compete adds nothing to the trade secret protection that applies
without a separate covenant (and, therefore, that applies in California). For present purposes, my goal is neither to survey, nor to reconcile judicial precedent in Massachusetts, but rather to focus on
outcomes. In this respect, Massachusetts lav accords significant impact to the presence of a postemployment covenant not to compete.
A recent discussion by a Massachusetts practitioner captures the additional protection provided by a covenant:
It is often a practical impossibility for a former employee to work in
the same industry for a competitor without employing or disclosing,
even unconsciously, the intellectual property of the former employer. Indeed, that intellectual property constitutes only one end
of the spectrum of the information, knowledge and expertise that an
employee develops in the course of working for an employer. The
demarcation line between such information, knowledge and expertise and truly proprietary information may not be ascertainable.
Even if it were, it is difficult or impossible for a company to determine whether a former employee is honoring the obligation to refrain from using information that is clearly over the line and into the
category of trade secrets. In these circumstances, a covenant not to
compete can provide an added measure of protection. 9 2
91 See, e.g., New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 363 N.E.2d 526,528-29 (Mass.
1977) (refusing to enforce noncompetition covenant absent showing of goodwill or similar
interest damaged by former employee's competition); Marine Contractors Co., Inc. v. Hurley, 310 N.E.2d 915, 919 (Mass. 1974) (upholding covenant not to compete where consideration was paid); All Stainless,Inc, 308 N.E.2d at 485-86 (upholding two-year covenant not
to compete but restricting geographical area to territory serviced by salesman prior to termination); Richmond Bros., Inc. v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., Inc., 256 N.E.2d 304, 307
(Mass. 1970) (refusing to enforce covenant not to compete against former employee wvhere
competition would be merely "ordinary" and former employee knew no trade secrets);
Wells v. Wells, 400 N.E.2d 1317, 1319 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that "employee covenants not to compete are enforceable only to the extent they are necessary to protect the

legitimate interests of the employer"); National Hearing Aid Ctrs., Inc. v. Avers, 311
N.E.2d 573,577 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974) (refusing to enforce covenant against employee who
did not appropriate any confidential customer information belonging to employer).
92 J.Charles Mokriski, Trade Secrets: Protect Your Competitive Edge-or Perish,
Mass. Law. Wkly., May 30, 1994, at 33, available in Westlaw, ALLNEWS database. Comprehensive Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 739 (4th Cir. 1993),
makes the same point:
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And the outcomes of litigated cases reflect the likelihood of enforcement: Of the ten decisions on preliminary injunctions to enforce covenants not to compete between February 1994 and July 1996,
injunctions were granted in eight. 93 Of special importance, the availability of preliminary injunctive relief with respect to covenants not to
compete contrasts sharply with the unavailability of summary judgment in the case of misappropriation of trade secrets. 94
In any event, my purpose is not to show that covenants not to
compete are uniformly enforceable under Massachusetts law. Rather,
I seek to establish only that Massachusetts law presents an initial condition which could give rise to the Route 128 employment pattern,
industrial organization, and business culture that Saxenian describes.
A significant probability that a postemployment covenant not to compete will be enforced, as clearly seems to be the case under Massachusetts law, would dictate a different career strategy. The risk to
employees from changing employers (and the risk to employers of hiring the former employees of competitors) or organizing a start-up
would encourage an employee to stay in her current job. The resulting dynamic would favor long-term career patterns, vertical integration, and, ultimately, internal rather than districtwide innovation. The
initial condition-a legal infrastructure that impedes employee mobility-generates a complementary business culture and institutions that,
once established, support a self-enforcing equilibrium.
Importantly, this aspect of Route 128's legal infrastructure would
not interfere with the industrial district's original development. Route
128 grew out of university-related agglomeration economies, a plentiful supply of skilled labor due to the presence of Harvard and MIT,
and the knowledge spillovers resulting from the university-run World
War II and Cold War research labs. 95 Because those laboratories were
nonprofit organizations, it is highly unlikely that they secured coveWhen an employee has access to confidential and trade secret information crucial to the success of the employer's business, the employer has a strong interest in enforcing a covenant not to compete because other legal remedies often
prove inadequate. It will often be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that a
competing employee has misappropriated trade secret information belonging
to his former employer.
93 See Edmund C. Case, Recent Developments in "Non-Compete" Litigation, Mass.
Law. Wkly., July 15, 1996, at 11, available in Westlaw, ALLNEWS database.
94 See Robert P. Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age 89
(1997) ("In a competitive industry, preventing the disclosure of trade secrets is far preferable to suing for misappropriation after they have already been disclosed. A noncompetition agreement may be a reasonable way for an employer to prevent a problem-and a
lawsuit-before it starts."); see also supra note 79 (describing barriers to summary judgment in trade secrets cases).
95 See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
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nants not to compete from their employees. Consistent with this analysis, a large number of Route 128 start-ups, including DEC, were
founded by scientists leaving these labs. 96 However, the legal infrastructure would present a barrier to the second-stage agglomeration
economy that sustains a high technology district by allowing it to reset
its product life cycle, an economy that did not develop in Route 128
but did in Silicon Valley.
3. CaliforniaLaw Governing Covenants Not to Compete
California law governing covenants not to compete is both unusual and radically different from that of Massachusetts. California
Business and Professions Code section 16600 provides that "every
contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void."' 97 The
courts have interpreted section 16600 "as broadly as its language
reads. '98 Other than two statutory exceptions (which track the general rule outside of California) allowing enforcement of covenants not
to compete associated with the sale of a business, 99 the statute's prohibition is essentially unqualified. For example, covenants that seek to
avoid the policy by penalizing, rather than prohibiting, postemployment competition are also prohibited. 100 While there are decisions
suggesting in dicta that California courts may enforce a covenant not
to compete when it is necessary to protect trade secrets, 101 I have un96 See supra text accompanying note 43 (noting that scientists from Iffrs Lincoln Lab
founded 50 companies and that scientists at ?Wfirs Instrumentation Lab founded 55).
97 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 (West 1997).
98 Scott v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1034, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
99 The statutory exceptions cover sales of a business whether effected through the sale
of the business's assets, the sale of shares in a corporation, or the sale of a partnership
interest. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16601 (Vest 1997) (sale of goodwill or corporation
shares; agreement not to compete); id. § 16602 (partners; dissolution, dissociation, or sale;
agreement not to compete).
100 See, e.g., Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Knobelauch, 653 F.d 393, 396 (9th Cir. 1981)
(invalidating under section 16600 employment contract term that required departing employee to repay advances if employee competed); Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelly Corp.,
398 P.2d 147, 149 (Cal. 1965) (in bank) (invalidating retirement plan term that caused
former employee to forfeit annuity payments if employee engaged in competing business);
Ware v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 791,796-97 (Ct. App.
1972) (invalidating under section 16600 profit-sharing plan term that caused former employee to forfeit benefits if employee engaged in competing business), aff'd, 414 U.S. 117
(1973).
101 See, e.g., Scott, 732 F. Supp. at 1043 (stating that "California courts recognize a judicially created exception to section 16600 and will enforce a restrictive covenant" to protect
employer's trade secrets); Trans-American Collections, Inc. v. Continental Account Servicing House, Inc. 342 F. Supp. 1303, 1305 (D. Utah 1972) (observing that in California,
covenant not to compete may be enforceable where necessary to protect trade secrets);
Muggill, 398 P.2d at 149 (holding that covenants not to compete are unenforceable "unless
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covered no case in which a California court actually enforced a covenant not to compete on that basis.' 0 2 Indeed, California courts'
application of choice of law rules underscores the seriousness with
which they view section 16600. Even if the employment agreement
which contains a postemployment covenant not to compete explicitly
designates the law of another state, under which the covenant would
be enforceable, as controlling, and even if that state has contacts with
the contract, California courts nonetheless will apply section 16600 on
3
behalf of California residents to invalidate the covenant. 0
Perhaps there is a California case that I have missed which enforces a covenant not to compete. But just as I did not attempt in the
previous section to establish that Massachusetts courts always enforced covenants not to compete, I do not seek here to demonstrate
that California courts never enforce a covenant not to compete
(although I would not be surprised by that outcome). Rather, my
more limited point is that California's legal infrastructure made it extremely unlikely that postemployment covenants not to compete
would be enforced. Coupled with the limited usefulness of trade secret law in California as elsewhere, Silicon Valley employers' early efforts to prevent employees from leaving to compete by using
employers' proprietary tacit knowledge failed.10 4 Employees learned
that they could leave; employers learned that they could not prevent
high velocity employment and the resulting knowledge spillover. And
that legal infrastructure caused employers, however reluctantly, to
adopt a different strategy, one of cooperation and competition, that
generated a dynamic process leading to Silicon Valley's characteristic
they are necessary to protect the employer's trade secrets"); Fowler v. Varian Assocs., Inc.,
241 Cal. Rptr. 539, 544-45 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that discharging employee for good
cause for assisting employer's competitors did not violate free competition policy behind
section 16600, as "agreements designed to protect an employer's proprietary information
do not violate section 16600").
102 Scott declined to enforce a covenant not to compete because it found no trade
secrets to protect. See 732 F. Supp. at 1043-45. Trans-American Collections, Inc. upheld a
covenant not to compete under Colorado law; its statement of California law was dictum.
See 342 F. Supp. at 1305. Muggill neither involved trade secrets, nor upheld anything;
instead the case voided under section 16600 a provision of an employment agreement that
terminated pension benefits if a former employee competed. See 398 P.2d at 149. Fowler
merely upheld the discharge of an employee who actively assisted the employer's competitor; no covenant not to compete was involved. See 241 Cal. Rptr. at 544-45.
103 See Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 811, 814 (Ct.
App. 1971) (applying California law to invalidate profit-sharing plan that terminated benefits if former employee competed with employer despite plan's validity under New York
law and contractual designation of New York law as controlling); Scott, 732 F. Supp. at
1039-40 ("[S]ection 16600 ... has been held by the California courts to represent a strong
public policy which would override the choice of law provision in the contract ....
104 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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employee career pattern, lack of vertical integration, knowledge spillovers, and business culture. Thus, the initial condition supplied by
Silicon Valley's legal infrastructure ultimately generated the conditions necessary to support a second-stage agglomeration economy,
which allowed it to reset its product cycle and thrive while Route 128
rode its product cycle down the curve.
4. Solving the Collective Action Problem
The analysis in the previous section sets out the role played by
Business and Professions Code section 16600 as an initial condition of
the strategic dynamic set in place by the growth of Silicon Valley. As I
argued in Part II, establishing a second-stage agglomeration economy
in the absence of a supporting legal infrastructure poses a collective
action problem for an industrial district. The collectively rational
strategy is to allow high velocity employment, because the per firm
benefit of the economy exceeds the per firm cost of the intellectual
property dilution that results from the knowledge spillovers necessary
to support the economy. However, the individually rational strategy
is for a single firm, and therefore every firm, to take advantage of
spillovers from the other firms but to restrict the mobility of its own
employees. An inability to solve the coordination problem would
then lock the district into the suboptimal strategy (and resulting career patterns, industrial organization, and business culture) dictated
by the prisoners' dilemma confronting the district.
The existence of Business and Professions Code section 16600
provided the coordination mechanism necessary to overcome this barrier to the development of a second-stage agglomeration economy.
By prohibiting covenants not to compete, section 16600 eliminated the
only effective strategy for pursuing the individually rational, but collectively suboptimal, strategy. No communication between firms was
necessary to this cooperative outcome. Each firm could discover independently (or from observing the experience of their competitors)
that trying to restrict employee mobility was ineffective. At that
point, the optimal individual strategy and the optimal collective strategy converged: Silicon Valley's legal infrastructure, in the form of
Business and Profession Code section 16600's prohibition of covenants not to compete, provided a pole around which Silicon Valley's
characteristic business culture and structure precipitated.105
105 Had employers remained persuaded even after a litigation strategy failed that the
cost of lost intellectual property exceeded the benefit of the knowledge spillover driven
agglomeration economy, they could have contracted around the problem despite Business
and Professions Code section 16600. Since the effect of prohibiting postemployment covenants not to compete is to transfer tacit trade secrets to employees, employers could reduce
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An Alternative Explanation

Alan Hyde has told a different story about the source of high
velocity employment in Silicon Valley. While his account shares my
emphasis on the importance of the legal infrastructure, he finds the
critical element not the prohibition of covenants not to compete, but
10 6 While I
California's effective elimination of trade secret protection.
agree with much of Professor Hyde's insightful analysis of the phenomenon that has claimed both of our attentions, on the question of
identifying the operative element of Silicon Valley's legal infrastructure, I am afraid he has the wrong culprit.
Hyde rejects the influence of covenants not to compete, based
largely on dicta in a number of cases that section 16600 does not prohibit covenants not to compete in support of trade secrets. 0 7 Because
misappropriation of trade secrets is independently prohibited, and if
covenants not to compete are enforceable if a trade secret is established, then in his analysis covenants not to compete add nothing to
wages to reflect the value of the transferred property right. In effect, the employers' inability to protect proprietary tacit knowledge renders it part of the employees' general human
capital-that is, capital that is valuable to employees in alternative employment. Under
standard human capital analysis, employees pay for the development of general human
capital through lower wages because they retain its continuing benefit. See Gary S.
Becker, Human Capital 33-40 (3d ed. 1993).
It is apparent that Silicon Valley employers did not follow this strategy. There is no
evidence that Silicon Valley salaries are systematically lower than those in Route 128,
where employees can be constrained by postemployment covenants not to compete and,
therefore, where proprietary tacit knowledge remains specific human capital paid for by
employers because it is of no value to employees in alternative employment. Cf. id. at 4051 (showing that completely specific training should have no effect on wages).
Alternatively, Silicon Valley employers could have protected their investment in proprietary tacit knowledge by arranging production so that employees did not learn enough
about the employers' intellectual property for it to become embedded in the employees'
human capital. Of course, this strategy would have substantial efficiency costs given the
reason that the proprietary knowledge was tacit in the first place. Again, Silicon Valley
employers appear not to have followed this strategy either, since Route 128 employers,
who are not subject to the inefficiency resulting from this response to California's statutory
constraint on intellectual property rights, have not outperformed their Silicon Valley competitors. See supra notes 2, 34-36.
The explanation for the absence of this kind of a Coasian response to section 16600 is
likely the employers' experience that the net effect of high velocity employment was positive, together with the development of supportive labor market institutions. At that point,
an individual employer that sought to reduce wages would be penalized by the labor market, and one that sought to structure production inefficiently would be penalized by the
product market. Learning through experience the benefit of the agglomeration economy
created by high velocity employment made an available Coasian response unappealing to
employers. I am grateful to participants at the University of Chicago Law School Law and
Economics Workshop for stressing the importance of considering a Coasian response to
section 16600.
106 See Hyde, supra note 9, at 25.
107 See id. at 26-28.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

June 1999]

HIGH TECHNOLOGY DISTRICTS

whatever protection is already provided by trade secret law. The operative element therefore must be the extent of trade secret protection. And the difference between Silicon Valley and Route 128's legal
infrastructure then must be a difference in the rigor of trade secret law
in California and Massachusetts.
My initial problem with the analysis is that Professor Hyde provides neither caselaw nor commentary supporting the proposition that
California trade secret law is less favorable to employers than that of
Massachusetts. Indeed, the formal evidence cuts the other way.
When California adopted the UTA in 1985, it made a significant
change in the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws's model statute. The model statute defines the confidentiality element of the definition of a trade secret as information that
derives value "from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainableby... other persons."108 Under this provision, all
trade secret protection is lost if a trade secret is available through public sources, regardless of whether a defendant actually obtained the
trade secret in so innocent a manner. 10 9 The California legislature replaced the italicized phrase, thereby providing broader trade secret
protection than the model act." 0 So if there were a narrowing of
trade secret protection in California, the culprit was not the
legislature.
Perhaps the culprit was the courts, although Hyde does not offer
case support for the proposition that California judges uniquely weakened trade secret protection. Nor does Hyde offer an explanation of
the dynamic by which judicial respect for trade secret protection deteriorated. While courts had to confront section 16600 at the time the
conflict over employee mobility began in the early years of Silicon
Valley, what moved them to dilute trade secret protection over the
vigorous objections of this new business community? And why was
the outcome different than in Massachusetts? One might echo Sax-

108 Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.LA. 438 (1990) (emphasis
added).
109 See Merges et al., supra note 94, at 44-45.
110 The legislature rewrote the statute to read that information is not a trade secret if it
is "generally known to the public or to other persons," rather than if it is "generally
known" or "readily ascertainable." See Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(d)(1) (West 1997); Merges
et al, supra note 94, at 44 & n.12 (noting that California modified UTA language by replacing reference to "readily ascertainable"). Although the statutory notes to this section
indicate that the change was intended to remove "ambiguity" in the language, the courts
have treated the provision as affording broader protection than the UTA. See, e.g., ABBA
Rubber Co. v. Seaquist, 286 Cal. Rptr. 518, 528 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that customer list
can be trade secret even if information it contains was available from trade directory).
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enian's proffer of culture, but as we have seen, that still leaves us in
search of an explanation for the culture."'
Hyde's perfunctory concern with the California courts and legislature is best explained by his interesting identification of a different
suspect. He argues that Silicon Valley lawyers subverted trade secret
protection. 11 2 Here Hyde draws on literature that assigns these lawyers the special "West Coast" transactional role of facilitator rather
than the "East Coast" role of problem raiser. 113 Hyde reports that
Silicon Valley lawyers who, in connection with the closing of venture
capital financing, provide investors with the legal opinion that the
start-up company has the right to use its technology, employ a narrower definition of trade secret than the courts and the California statute. 114 The explanation for this practice is that the lawyers know that
the former employer of the start-up's founders will not sue anyway.
In Hyde's view this protection comes not necessarily because trade
secret law is unfavorable, but because the reputational consequences
III See supra text accompanying notes 61-64 (summarizing Saxenian's cultural argument
for differences in Silicon Valley and Route 128). There is evidence, of the variety captured
by the comment that a lawyer's definition of data is the plural of anecdote, that real actors
think the difference between California and Massachusetts law governing covenants not to
compete is important. In Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 968
F.2d 1463 (1st Cir. 1992), Ferrofluidics Corporation, a producer of magnetic fluid rotary
seals used in the manufacture of semiconductor chips, hired Sickles as a product manager
of its Seals Division in 1985, and thereafter promoted him to general manager of the division. See id. at 1465. In 1990, when "Ferro was suffering, along with much of the New
England high-tech industry, from a downturn in the economy," id., Sickles accepted an
offer from the Nippon Ferrofluidics Corporation (NFC) (which had been Ferro's Japanese
subsidiary) to start a competing magnetic seal rotary fluid business in the United States.
See id.
Sickles moved to California to start the new venture, Advanced Vacuum Components,
Inc. (AVC), in the hope that he could evade his noncompete covenant by subjecting the
new business to California law. See id. at 1466. Sickles had "received advice from lawyers
on several occasions, some of which he in turn related to NFC, including the nugget that
'[1]egal complications will be greatly reduced by incorporating [the new venture] in California since this state strongly protects the entrepreneur and, in general, does not recognize
non-compete agreements."' Id. (alterations in original) (quotation unattributed). In 1991,
AVC and Ferro "raced to the courthouse": AVC requested a judicial declaration invalidating his restrictive covenant under California law; Ferro initiated a lawsuit to enforce the
covenant in New Hampshire Federal District Court (which applied New Hampshire law
despite the terms of the covenant itself). See id. at 1466-67. Ferro won the race as the
district court issued a permanent injunction enforcing the covenant for three years. See id.
at 1467. On appeal, the First Circuit upheld the injunction and avoided the choice of law
question, but noted that the result would be no different under Massachusetts law. See id.
at 1471.
112 See Hyde, supra note 9, at 33.
113 See Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and
the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 L. & Soc. Inquiry 679, 690-91
(1996) (describing Silicon Valley lawyers as facilitators of economic development).
114 See Hyde, supra note 9, at 33.
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to the former employer in the labor market will outweigh the gains
from enforcing its intellectual property rights. 115 Anticipating this
analysis, lawyers are more aggressive in their opinions than the law on
the books alone would warrant, because a claim will never be made
challenging their opinion.
Reliance on reputational effects is not helpful here, because the
reputation argument presumes a business culture that supports highvelocity employment. Yet the very point of establishing the initial
conditions that give rise to the second-stage agglomeration economy is
to explain the existence of that business culture. Moreover, we still
have no explanation for the origins of the differences between the two
districts' legal infrastructures. Finally, there is also a more straightforward explanation for the Silicon Valley lawyers' conduct. As I argued
in Part lILA, enforcement of trade secret claims in Massachusetts
confronts significant procedural and substantive barriers. The closing
opinions said to be given by Silicon Valley lawyers are also consistent
with what appears to be the "law in action" in Massachusetts. Covenants not to compete are said to provide employers critical additional
protection in Massachusetts precisely because trade secret protection
of tacit knowledge is ineffective. Thus, the likelihood of a subsequent
challenge to an aggressive lawyer's opinion is similarly reduced.
In the end, the different treatment of postemployment covenants
not to compete remains the most likely difference in the legal infrastructures of Silicon Valley and Route 128 that led the two districts
down their ultimately quite different paths. But although the analysis
thus far explains the importance of the legal infrastructure to high
technology industrial districts, it still is one step short of explaining the
source of the initial conditions in Silicon Valley.
IV
SERENDIPITY

Identifying Business and Professions Code section 16600 as a key
factor precipitating Route 128's distinct business culture still leaves
one critical question unanswered. We need to know the origins of this
unusual statute to identify fully the initial conditions that led to the
second-stage agglomeration economy that provided Silicon Valley's
salvation. And here the special role of serendipity, of the importance
of historical accident stressed by Arthur and Krugman,116 takes center
stage. Section 16600 was not the result of the prescience of the California legislature. Rather, it grew out of the nineteenth century coin115 See id. at 135-38.
116 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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cidence of the codification movement in American law, personified by
the efforts of David Dudley Field in New York, and the need for a
new state to bring some order to the chaotic condition of its laws following its admission to the Union.
The history of California Business and Professions Code section
16600 begins in New York in 1847. In that year, Field was appointed
as one of three commissioners charged by the recently adopted New
York Constitution "to revise, reform, simplify and abridge the rules
and practice, pleadings, forms and proceedings of the courts of record
of this State. ' 117 Field dominated the process, which resulted in a rev-

olutionary civil procedure code that the New York legislature
promptly enacted." 8 Field's efforts continued in 1847, when the New
York legislature appointed him to the Code Commission charged with
codifying substantive law. 1 9 Despite the controversy associated with
his efforts, 20 Field produced a Civil Code in 1865,121 but the Code was
never enacted in New York.' 22 Instead, it found its only home in the
West. The needs of newly admitted states, especially California, to
impose some order on jurisdictions with conflicting legal traditions
and no single body of law coincided with the peak of Field's codification crusade.12: 3 Field found a special ally in California, his brother
Stephen J. Field, a member of the California legislature at the time the
117 N.Y. Const. of 1846, art. VI, § 24.
118 See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 391 (2d ed. 1985) (describing history of Field's codification efforts).
119 See id.
120 Friedman notes: "The codification movement is one of the set pieces of American
legal history. It has its hero, Field; its villain is James C. Carter of New York, who fought
the idea of codification with as much vigor as Field fought for it." Id. at 403 (footnote
omitted).
121 See Daun van Ee,David Dudley Field and the Reconstruction of the Law 51 (American Legal and Constitutional History: A Garland Series of Outstanding Dissertations
(Harold Hyman & Stuart Bruchey eds., 1986)).
122 The Civil Code twice was passed by both houses of the New York legislature between 1879 and 1882, but was vetoed by the governor both times. See Mathias Reimann,
The Historical School Against Codification: Savigny, Carter, and the Defeat of the New
York Civil Code, 37 Am. J. Comp. L. 95, 101 (1989) (documenting codification efforts in
New York). Reimann places the Civil Code at the very center of the conflict over codification: "The bone of contention.., was the Civil Code-for Field the centerpiece of his
whole agenda, for Carter its truly pernicious part." Id. at 99-100 (footnote omitted).
Field's Code Commission also produced a Political Code in 1860, and a Penal Code in
1864. See van Ee, supra note 121, at 50. The Penal Code was ultimately adopted in 1882.
See Reimann, supra, at 99.
123 See Arvo Van Alstyne, Introduction to West's Annotated California Codes, Civil
Code 1 (1954) ("From the raising of the American flag by Commodore Sloat at Monterey
on July 7, 1846 to the organization of constitutional state government in 1849, the legal
history of California is one of disorder and confusion."); Rosamond Parma, The History of
the Adoption of the Codes of California, 22 L. Libr. J. 8, 8-9 (1929) (outlining disarray of
California law upon entering Union in 1850).
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state adopted Field's Civil Procedure Code in 1851,124 and later Chief

Justice of the California Supreme Court and an Associate Justice of
the United States Supreme Court.12-

In 1850, the California legislature officially adopted the "common
law of England" 12 6 to supplant pre-statehood Spanish and Mexican
law. However, the extensive reach of the old Mexican land grant system, together with the overriding federal exceptions carved out by the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which ended the Mexican-American
War in 1848,127 diminished the effect of legislation attempting to abol-

ish and repeal all prior law in California. 128 A contemporaneous account captures the chaotic legal environment:
It is safe to say that, even in the experience of new countries hastily
settled by heterogeneous crowds of strangers from all countries, no
such example of legal or judicial difficulties was ever before
presented as has been illustrated in the history of California. There
was no general or common source of jurisprudence. Law was to be
administered almost without a standard. There was the civil law, as
adulterated or modified by Mexican provincialism, usages, and habitudes, for a great part of the litigation; and there was the common
law for another part, but what that was was to be decided from the
conflicting decisions of any number of courts in America and
England... 129

Consequently, throughout the 1860s, a series of governors, including
Leland Stanford, urged a codification of California's laws. 130 After a
124 Field introduced both the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure in the California
legislature. See Stephen J. Field, Personal Reminiscences of Early Days in California 72
(Da Capo Press 1968) (1893).
125 See Van Alstyne, supra note 123, at 6.
2 See Act of Apr. 13, 1850, ch. 95, 1849 Cal. Stat. 219 (current version at Cal. Civ.
Code § 22.2 (West 1997)) (stating that common law of England, "so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the laws of the State
of California," provides rule of decision in California courts).
127 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat.
922 (1862).

128 That legislation stated:

[A]UI laws now in force in this State, except such as have been passed or
adopted by the Legislature, are hereby repealed: Provided, however, that no
rights acquired, contracts made, or suits pending, shall be affected thereby; and
Provided that the laws relating to "Jueces del Campo," or Judges of the Plains,
shall be excepted, until provision is made for that office by law; and Provided,
also that such repeal shall not affect any Constitutional Laws or Acts of Congress, or any of the stipulations contained in the Treaty of Peace between the
United States and Mexico, ratified at Queretaro, the 30th day of May, 1848.
Act of Apr. 22, 1850, ch. 125, 1849 Cal. Stat. 342.
129 Judge Joseph G. Baldwin, The Career of Judge Field on the Supreme Bench of California, Sacramento Union, May 6, 1863, reprinted in Field, supra note 124, at 111, 113.
130 See Parma, supra note 123, at 13 (detailing history of codification effort).
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false start in 1868, the legislature in 1870 appointed a commission to
revise and compile the laws of the State of California. 131
The commission moved promptly the next year to adopt Field's
proposed New York Civil Code in total. 132 Indeed, the Commission's
original version of the California Civil Code contained most of the
New York commission's annotations, although as adopted by the legislature in 1872 the Code replaced the direct citations to the New York
Civil Code with references to California cases. It was in section 833 of
Field's proposed New York Code, adopted verbatim by the California
legislature in 1872,133 that we find the precursor of Business and Professions Code section 16600.
Section 833 of the proposed New York Civil Code and the 1872
California Civil Code provided the general rule:
Section 833. Every Contract by which anyone is restrained from
exercising a lawful trade or business of any kind, otherwise than as
provided by the next two sections, is to that extent void.' 3"

The following two sections contained exceptions for covenants
not to compete in connection with the sale of a business or the dissolution of a partnership:
131 See id. at 15. A commission was appointed in May 1868, but committed political
suicide by announcing its intention to repeal the grand jury system. The legislature disbanded the original commission and empowered its replacement to disregard the work of
its predecessors. See id. at 14-15. By this time, Stephen Field was serving as an Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
132 In its preface to the draft of the Civil Code, the Commission stated:
The citizen and the lawyer alike complain over the want of a condensed
methodical expression of the law. The Civil Code of New York-a monument
of legal wisdom and patient industry-is a collection of Common Law rules
and principles, combined with a consolidation of statutes like our own, all concisely stated, logically and harmoniously arranged, in order of subjects corresponding to Blackstone's Commentaries.
Code Commissioners, Preface to Revised Laws of the State of California iv (1871).
133 Following California's lead, the Dakota Territory adopted a similar civil code in 1877,
which also acknowledged the influence of the New York Civil Code and the more recent
California Civil Code. See George H. Hand, Preface to Revised Codes of the Territory of
Dakota iv (1883). When the territory became two separate states, each retained the Code.
Montana followed in 1895 with a similar civil code, also acknowledging New York and
California. See Mont. Civ. Code §§ 1-4674 (1895); see also Andrew P. Morriss, "This State
Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws"-Lessons From One Hundred Years of Codification in
Montana, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 359 (1995). Lawrence Friedman provides an interesting explanation of the Field Civil Code's success in the West:
The success of the codes in the West was due to reasons that by now are familiar. These were sparsely settled states in a hurry to ingest a legal system. A
few had something of a civil-law tradition. In none of the Western states did
the bar have a strong vested interest in the continuance of old rules, especially
rules of pleading.
Friedman, supra note 118, at 406.
134 Compare N.Y. Civ. Code § 833 (1865), with Cal. Civ. Code § 1673 (1872).
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Section 834. One who sells the good will of a business may agree
with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within
a specified county, so long as the buyer, or any person deriving
title
5
13
to the good will through him, carries on a like business.

Section 835. Partners may, upon or in anticipation of a dissolution
of a partnership, agree that none of them will carry on a similar
business within the same city or town where the partnership136business has been transacted, or within a specified part thereof.
Parts of Field's formulation reflected the state of the law on restraints at that time in New York and elsewhere. By this point, courts
in England applied a rule of reason to evaluate contractual restrictions
on the conduct of a trade or business. 137 From the time of Mitchel v.
Reynolds138 in 1711, English law distinguished between postemployment contractual restraints on employees, and restraints arising out of
the sale of a business.' 39 The latter generally were upheld, but the
former were held to more rigorous scrutiny and unreasonable restraints-in duration or coverage-were struck down. 140 This approach ultimately grew into a "rule of reason" that required judicial
balancing of interests, including those of the public, in determining a
restriction's validity. American law generally followed the English
141
pattern, albeit with special concern for the interests of employees.
But except for a period during which general restrictions-those
whose application was not limited geographically-were routinely invalidated, American courts did not apply a per se rule of invalidity
with respect to either postemployment restraints or those associated
142
with the sale of a business.
For our purposes, the sequence of sections 833 through 835 differs from the presently existing body of law in one critical respect.
While sections 834 and 835 carry forward the existing law's sanction of
covenants not to compete associated with the sale of a business, secCompare N.Y. Civ. Code § 834 (1865), with Cal. Civ. Code § 1674 (1872).
Compare N.Y. Civ. Code § 835 (1865), with Cal. Civ. Code § 1675 (1872).
137 See Blake, supra note 88, at 639-40 (discussing Homer v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735, 131
Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831), and Hitchcock v. Coker, 113 Eng. Rep. 167 (Ex 1837)).
138 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 348 (K.B. 1711) (holding that contract with lessee of bakehouse
not to compete as baker in same parish as lessor "ought to be maintained").
139 Mitchel v. Reynolds established the reasonableness standard for restraints attached
to the transfer of a business. Id. In the years leading up to Mitchel v. Reynolds, "the courts
recognized that agreements not to compete given in connection with the sale of a business
was [sic] different from normal employee restrictive covenants." Valiulis, supra note 83, at
159.
140 See Valiulis, supra note 88, at 162-63.
141 See Blake, supra note 88, at 643-44 (noting that in United States, "more emphasis
was placed on protecting the employee from overly heavy burdens and less on the conclusiveness of contractual terms").
142 Blake, supra note 88, at 629-44, develops this history.
135,
'136
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tion 833 voids all other restraints, including especially postemployment covenants not to compete.
It is impossible to know exactly what Field had in mind in this
sequence. These sections were added late in the development of the
Code, and had not been part of the preliminary draft circulated to
judges and lawyers in 1862.143 The comment to section 833 expresses
a concern that "contracts in restraint of trade have been allowed, by
modem decisions, to a very dangerous extent,"'144 and refers to two
cases: Dunlop v. Gregory145 and Whittaker v. Howe.146 Both cases
involve noncompetition covenants associated with the sale of a business. In Dunlop v. Gregory, the Hudson River Steamboat Association, which operated a passenger service on the Hudson River
between New York, Albany, and Troy, owned five boats outright, and
two-thirds of a sixth.147 A covenant not to operate a passenger boat
north of Saugerties on the Hudson was attached to the Association's
purchase of the remaining one-third interest in the jointly owned
boat.' 48 In Whittaker v. Howe, a covenant not to compete anywhere
in Great Britain for twenty years was attached to the sale of a law
practce.1 49 The comment to section 833 makes no reference to postemployment covenants not to compete. 50
The comments to the California Civil Code provide no more guidance. Sections 833 through 835 of the proposed New York Code became sections 1673 through 1675 of the California Civil Code. The
California Code Commissioners' 1871 draft contains only a citation to
the New York section, and the text of the New York comment. 51 The
1872 official version expands the original New York comment to include references to California cases. 152 However, these cases, like
Compare N.Y. Civ. Code § 833 (1865), with N.Y. Civ. Code (draft 1862).
See N.Y. Civ. Code § 833, cmt. (1865).
145 10 N.Y. 241 (1851).
146 49 Eng. Rep. 150 (M.R. 1841).
147 See Dunlop, 10 N.Y. at 241.
148 See id. at 242.
149 See Whittaker, 49 Eng. Rep. at 150.
150 The comments to sections 834 and 835 add nothing to the analysis. Both refer only
to the need to specify accurately the breadth of an allowable covenant not to compete, and
neither contains case citations. See N.Y. Civ. Code §§ 833 cmt., 834 cmt. (1865).
151 See Cal. Revised Laws § 1673 (1871).
143
144

152 See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1673-1675 cmt. (1872) (citing More v. Bonnet, 40 Cal. 251,25455 (1870)) (involving contract not to practice asphalt roofing or pavement laying if purchaser of tools for such business became delinquent in payments); Wright v. Ryder, 36 Cal.
342, 361 (1868) (involving contract upon sale of boat disallowing boat to run on any rivers,
bays, or waters of State of California); California Steamboat Navigation Co. v. Wright, 6
Cal. 258, 262 (1856) (involving contract not to allow boat to navigate certain waters of
California for three years where consideration was paid).
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those discussed by the New York annotation, do not deal with postemployment covenants not to compete 5 3
Thus, beginning with the enactment of the Civil Code in 1872,

California law on postemployment covenants not to compete diverged
from that of Massachusetts and the rest of the large industrial states.

The rule of reason, clearly in place in Massachusetts by 1869154 and
adopted in New York by 1887,1 55 came to cover postemployment covenants. Subsequent revision of the California codes made minor
changes in the language of sections 1673 through 1675, and moved the
sections from the Civil Code to their present place as sections 16600
through 16602 of the Business and Professions Code. However, the
substantive peculiarity of California law remained intact until the
1960s.15 6 At that point the development of a high technology industrial district in Silicon Valley brought this serendipitous element of
California's legal infrastructure to center stage. Field's accident of history then served as the coordinating mechanism which supported a
second-stage agglomeration economy. The rest, as they say, is history.
V
IMPLICATIONS: THREE CAUTIONARY NOTES
My account of the role of the legal infrastructure of high technology industrial districts is now complete. The new economic geography
stresses the importance of initial conditions in shaping an industrial
district's business culture and industrial organization. The presence in
Silicon Valley of a second-stage agglomeration economy based on intercompany knowledge spillovers has allowed that district to reset its
product cycle repeatedly. The absence of such spillovers in Route 128
has left that district to ride down the product cycle associated with the
153 See supra note 152.
154 See Morse Twist Drill & Mach. Co. v. Morse, 103 Mass. 73, 77 (1869) (holding that
noncompetition clause in employment contract was valid and enforceable, as restriction
was not "in any way unreasonable").
155 See Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 423 (N.Y. 1887) (enunciating and
adopting reasonableness standard in enforcing former employee's covenant not to
compete).
156 The growth in the size of the Civil Code resulted in the biggest change: its dismemberment. The 1930 Code Commission suggested that portions of the Civil Code be broken
off into separate codes. See Van Alstyne, supra note 123, at 24. The Probate Code was the
first spin-off in 1931. See ch. 281, 1931 Cal. Stat. 587, 687 (repealing Civil Code §§ 236-257,
1270-1409). The Business and Professions Code was created in 1937. See ch. 399, 1937
Cal. Stat. 1229. Sections 16600 through 16602 were added to the Business and Professions
Code, and sections 1673 through 1675 were deleted from the Civil Code in 1941. See Act
of May 31, 1941, ch. 526, 1941 Cal. Stat. 1834, 1847 (noting derivation from Civil Code
sections 1673 to 1675). The new section 16601 was expanded to include sales of corporate
shares as well as sales of good will, but the broad prohibition of employee postemployment
covenants remained undisturbed. See id.
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minicomputer. The difference in initial conditions that helps account
for the incidence of this economy and the resulting difference in the
two districts' long-term success is found in a critical difference in the
two districts' legal infrastructures. The rules governing employer-imposed restraints on employee mobility-the mechanism by which intercompany knowledge spillovers take place-differ sharply in the
two districts. California law voids such restraints, thereby encouraging knowledge spillovers; Massachusetts law generally enforces them,
thereby blocking the critical knowledge spillovers.
Each legal infrastructure gave rise to a dynamic that helped shape
each district's characteristic business culture and industrial organization, one compatible with development of a second-stage agglomeration economy and one not. Consistent with the new economic
geography's emphasis on the importance of historical accident, the explanation for the two districts' different legal infrastructure lies in the
temporal coincidence of California's need for a coherent body of law
following statehood, and David Dudley Field's proposed New York
Civil Code. In 1872, California adopted without explanation Field's
proposed prohibition of postemployment covenants not to compete;
Massachusetts, like most other industrial states, instead followed a
rule of reason that sanctioned such covenants subject to judicial review of their duration and coverage.
Like any good story, my chronicle of the importance of the legal
infrastructure of high technology industrial districts has a number of
possible morals, and potentially instructive implications for related debates. In closing I want to take up briefly three such implications.
The first concerns the story's implications for the standard law and
economics account of the importance of completely protecting property rights in intellectual property. The second deals with a recent line
of cases, involving claims of "inevitable disclosure" by departing employees, that threatens to turn trade secret law into a judicially imposed de facto covenant not to compete. The third considers the
story's lesson for regional planners seeking to establish or preserve
industrial districts. While each of these implications warrants far
more attention than is possible here, I want to add a cautionary note
that counsels in favor of a more textured, less categorical analysis in
each case.
A.

The Conflict Between ProtectingProperty Rights in Intellectual
Capital and Second-Stage Agglomeration Economies
The standard law and economics prescription stresses the importance of fully protecting the property rights of the producers of intellectual property. In the absence of complete protection, producers
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vill not capture all of the gains resulting from their efforts, and too
little intellectual property will be produced.15 7 The importance of interemployer knowledge spillovers to the second-stage agglomeration
economy that has preserved Silicon Valley sounds a note of caution
with respect to an unqualified application of the standard analysis.
We may need a more textured approach that takes into account the
benefit of an industrial-district-preserving agglomeration economy. 15s
As I suggested earlier, 159 the comparison is between the average per
firm cost of diluted intellectual property protection and the average
per firm benefit associated with the preservation of the high technology industrial district.
Of course, which direction the comparison favors is an empirical
question, and one that should not be resolved with, as Professor Trebilcock puts it, "casual empiricism that proves nothing." 160 But the
difference in performance of Silicon Valley and Route 128 is a little
more than casual and, in any event, the absence of empirical evidence
hardly resolves the matter in favor of either side of the argument.
We can perhaps advance the issue by using Silicon Valley to
frame a kind of sensitivity analysis. The fact is that firms in Silicon
Valley have always been free to opt out of California's legal infrastructure. A firm need only move its intellectual-property-producing activities out of California to avoid the property-rights-diluting effect of
Business and Professions Code section 16600.161 If in the calculus of a
particular firm the cost of diluted property rights protection outweighs
the benefit of the agglomeration economy by more than the firm's and
its employees' relocation costs, the firm can simply move to, say, Massachusetts. And if the matter were as simple as an unqualified property rights analysis would have it, one would have expected waves of
defections. To be sure, some companies have moved operations out of
Silicon Valley. However, the migration appears to be of manufacturing and assembly operations, presumably motivated by the increased
factor prices resulting from congestion, rather than of the innovative
M Michael J. Trebilcock, The Common Law of Restraint of Trade: A Legal and Economic Analysis 152-53 (1986), makes the standard argument with respect to giving California employers more tools to protect their intellectual property against departing
employees. Edmund NV. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J.Legal Stud. 683,710 (1980), also develops this analysis, although he recognizes the
anomaly presented by Silicon Valley.
158 Hyde, supra note 9, at 48-50, also develops this point, although our emphasis differs.
159 See supra text following note 68.
160 Trebilcock, supra note 157, at 153.
161 Indeed, that strategy would have reduced the role of section 16600 as a coordinating
mechanism because an alternative strategy to acceptance of high velocity employment
would thereby be available: A firm could exit.
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activities whose location would be influenced by the level of intellectual property protection. 162 Empirical evidence concerning this sort of
balance of trade may be available to help resolve the dispute, or at
least move the analysis forward.
One piece of casual empiricism, however, should be noted, if only
to highlight the kind of phenomenon an unqualified property rights
analysis will have to explain. Recently, the large Swiss pharmaceutical
company Novartis AG announced that it would invest $250 million in
a proprietary research institute in genomics, a form of biotechnology
in which the large pharmaceuticals typically have bought expertise,
rather than develop it themselves. 163 This investment has as its sole
purpose the creation of intellectual property. Where, then, does
Novartis site its new intellectual property factory: where the legal infrastructure fully protects intellectual property rights, or where the
company will have the benefit of an industrial district? The new facility will be located in La Jolla, California, a burgeoning biotech industrial district' 64 that is, of course, subject to California Business and
Professions Code section 16600.165
B. Resisting Inevitable Disclosure Analysis in California
The "inevitable disclosure" line of cases in trade secret law represents the doctrinal analogue to the classic law and economics emphasis on fully protecting property rights in intellectual property. Under
this doctrine, some courts have constructed a noncontractual covenant
not to compete by enjoining a departing employee from beginning a
new job with a competitor of the former employer. 66 The injunction
is based on a finding that because of the nature of the trade secrets
involved, the employee must inevitably use or disclose them in working for a competitor, regardless of the employee's good faith. California courts have not yet considered the inevitable disclosure doctrine,
but California practitioners have begun to raise it as an alternative to
162 See Saxenian, supra note 11, at 93 (describing semiconductor firms' movement of
unskilled assembly and test operations to Asia).
163 See Novartis Plans to Build Genetic-Research Center, Wall St. J., Apr. 9, 1998, at
A4.
164 See David B. Audretsch & Paula E. Stephan, Company-Scientist Locational Links:
The Case of Biotechnology, 86 Am. Econ. Rev. 641, 642-49 (1996) (describing concentration of biotech firms in San Diego area).
165 To be sure, Novartis had a more focused reason for locating the facility in La Jolla. It
will be built adjacent to the Scripps Research Institute, "with which Novartis already has a
10-year, $200 million agreement giving Novartis first rights of refusal to discoveries." Lawrence M. Fisher, Novartis Plans to Research Disease Genes: $250 Million Center Set for
California, N.Y. Tunes, Apr. 8, 1998, at D5. But this kind of clustering is precisely what is
said to result from agglomeration economies.
166 See Milgrim on Trade Secrets, supra note 74, § 5.02[3][d]-[e] (citing cases).
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contractual postemployment restrictions. 167 The importance of a
knowledge spillover-based second-stage agglomeration economy to
Silicon Valley's repeated renewal strongly suggests that California
courts should be quite cautious in allowing the use of an inevitable
disclosure claim to evade Business and Professions Code section
16600. The straightforward application of the doctrine should not seriously test a California court's resolve. A more oblique application
of the doctrine, which better fits dicta in existing California caselaw, is
a more serious threat.16
Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond 169 illustrates the potential reach of the
inevitable disclosure doctrine. The litigation was triggered when
Quaker Oats hired Redmond, then Pepsico's manager of California
sports drink operations, as Vice President-Field Operations for
Quaker Oats's Gatorade brand. 170 At the time Redmond was hired,
Pepsico had begun a new marketing and promotion campaign for its
17 1
"All Sports" beverage, which directly competed with Gatorade.
Although Redmond had not signed a postemployment covenant not
to compete, Pepsico sought an injunction barring Redmond from
working for Quaker Oats based on the theory that Redmond would
inevitably disclose Pepsico's trade secrets. 17 Relying on the Illinois
version of the UTA, the court concluded that Redmond could not
help but use his knowledge of Pepsico's proprietary pricing, marketing, and promotion strategies for its sports drink when undertaking
precisely the same responsibilities for Quaker Oats's competing
brand. How could Redmond plan a strategy for Quaker Oats without
relying on what he knew would be Pepsico's reaction? As the district
court concluded, "unless Redmond possessed an uncanny ability to
compartmentalize information, he would necessarily be making decisions about Gatorade and Snapple by relying on his knowledge of
[Pepsico's] trade secrets."' 7 3 On that basis, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's order prohibiting Redmond from beginning
work at Quaker Oats for six months.
Pepsico, Inc. illustrates the problem the inevitable disclosure doctrine presents for California courts. Suppose Redmond's new job,
167 See Weiss et al., supra note 77, at 7-8.
168 See infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
169 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
170 See id. at 1264-65.
171 See id. at 1264.

172 See id. at 1265-66. Presumably the absence of a contractual covenant not to compete
reflected the California situs of Redmond's Pepsico employment and the existence of Business and Professions Code section 16600. The case was decided under Illinois law. See id.
at 1267.
173 Id. at

1269.
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rather than his old one, had been in California. California law then
would have governed the issue. The statutory conflict for a California
court is straightforward. On the one hand, Business and Professions
Code section 16600 prohibits postemployment covenants not to compete. On the other hand, California's version of the UTA authorizes
injunctive relief against misappropriation of trade secrets. 174 Preventing misappropriation by enjoining postemployment competition creates the statutory friction.
More specifically, the inevitable disclosure doctrine threatens just
the type of knowledge spillover that has been so critical to Silicon
Valley. It is because of the very character of tacit knowledge that an
employee cannot avoid its use. To take an obvious example, a high
technology employee frequently learns not only how to make a product, but how not to make it as well-that is, what manufacturing techniques do not work. Knowledge that particular approaches are
ineffective is very valuable in a fast moving high technology industry;
the time saved not going down dead ends means getting a product to
market sooner. How does an employee not use his former employer's
proprietary knowledge that an approach will not work if he is working
in the same area for a competitor?
The inevitable disclosure doctrine remains controversial outside
of California. Although one court has followed Pepsico in enjoining
competing employment in the absence of a postemployment covenant
not to compete, 175 others have rejected requests for injunctive relief in
the absence of a covenant, 176 sometimes stating explicitly that this
area is for contract. 177 Moreover, the cases lend themselves to resolution based on a close parsing of the facts. Consistent with the judicial
balancing associated with rule-of-reason review of contractual postemployment restrictions (and the standard balancing of the equities
required for injunctive relief), courts relying on the inevitable discloSee Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.2(a) (West 1997).
See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1457-58 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (discussing Pepsico and applying inevitable disclosure doctrine).
176 See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, 47 F.3d 467, 469 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming
district court's refusal to grant preliminary injunction restraining former employee from
working for competitor); Cudahy Co. v. American Labs., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (D.
Neb. 1970) (noting absence of covenant not to compete in dismissing unfair business practice claim).
177 The district court in Campbell Soup Co. stated that "if Campbell had wanted to
protect itself against the competition of former employees, it should have done so by contract. This court will not afford such protection after the fact." Campbell Soup Co. v.
Giles, No. 94-40177-NMG (D. Mass. Dec. 12, 1994), quoted in Anthony A. Bongiorno &
James J. Marcellino, Noncompetes: Worth Their Weight on Paper?, Mass. Law. Wkly.,
Oct. 28, 1996, at 11.
174

175
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sure doctrine have stressed employee misbehavior in justifying an
injunction. 78

The inevitable disclosure doctrine can come before California
courts in two ways: directly in support of injunctive relief despite the
absence of a postemployment covenant not to compete; and indirectly
in support of enforcement of an existing contractual restriction. Cali179
fornia courts are likely to confront the issue first in its direct form.
Given the state's long history of prohibiting covenants not to compete,
few firms will have required their employees to sign contracts widely
understood in the legal and business communities to be unenforceable. In this guise, a California court should have little difficulty concluding that Business and Professions Code section 16600 forecloses
the use of the inevitable disclosure doctrine to create a de facto covenant not to compete. California courts routinely have seen through
other efforts to accomplish indirectly what section 16600 prohibits di1 The UTA's general authorization of injunctive relief hardly
rectly. 80
trumps such a long-standing and specific statutory prohibition.18 1
When presented in its indirect form, the inevitable disclosure doctrine is more troublesome. While section 16600 and the UTA plainly
178 See, e.g., APAC Teleservices Inc. v. McCrae, 985 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Iowa 1997)
(granting temporary injunction preventing former employee from revealing trade secrets
after finding defendant deceitful in his representations about new employment); Merck &
Co., 941 F. Supp. 1443 (granting preliminary injunction to former employer where employee lied about new employer); Surgived Corp. v. Eye Technology, 648 F. Supp. 661 (D.
Minn. 1986) (providing lengthy analysis of former employees' misdeeds before granting
permanent injunction against disclosure of trade secrets); cf. Fowler v. Varian Assocs., Inc.,
241 Cal. Rptr. 539, 545 (Ct. App. 1987) (discussing former employee's failure to disclose
disloyalty to employer and rejecting his claim that discharge violated free-competition public policy evidenced by § 16600).
179 The inevitable disclosure doctrine is said to have been before the California Superior
Court for Santa Clara County in Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Hyundai Electronics
America, No. CV752679 (Super. Ct. 1996). See Weiss et aL, supra note 77 (describing
unpublished order in that case granting preliminary injunction enjoining five former Advanced Micro Devices employees from working on specific technology at new employer);
see also Hanna Bui-Eve, To Hire or Not to Hire: What Silicon Valley Companies Should
Know About Hiring Competitors' Employees, 48 Hastings LJ. 981, 998 (1997) (discussing
use of inevitable disclosure doctrine in California courts).
180 See supra note 100.
181 Post-Pepsico caselaw is consistent with this distinction. In most cases, inevitable disclosure analysis is invoked by litigants to justify enforcing a contractual postemployment
covenant not to compete under the rule of reason. See La Calhbne, Inc. v. Spolyar, 93S F.
Supp. 523,530-31 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (noting inevitability of disclosure and granting preliminary injunction enforcing covenant not to compete); Uncle B's Bakery, Inc. v. O'Rourke,
920 F. Supp. 1405, 1432-33 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (finding non-competition clause reasonable
due to fact that former employee, in new job, had opportunity to exploit special knowledge
gained from former employer); Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624,632 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) (finding covenant not to compete reasonable where disclosure of trade secrets by
former employee was inevitable).
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face different directions, California caselaw does suggest an accommodation of the two statutes that would leave room at least doctrinally
for enforcing trade secret-based postemployment restrictions.
Although in dicta, the California Supreme Court has stated that covenants not to compete are unenforceable "unless necessary to protect
the employer's trade secrets,' u82 a phrase that has been repeated,
equally hypothetically, by other courts. 183 Now suppose that a wellcounseled employer requires a recent employee to sign a postemployment covenant not to compete whose recitals explicitly invoke the involuntary disclosure doctrine as a justification: that the employee
must receive the employer's trade secrets in order to do her work, that
the trade secrets are of a character that inevitably would be disclosed
if the employer worked for a competitor, and that the covenant not to
compete is necessary to protect them. Later, when the employer
seeks to enforce the covenant not to compete against the departing
employee, the inevitable disclosure doctrine can be rationalized as
simply giving substance to an exception to Business and Professions
Code section 16600, the potential for which has long been recognized
in California law. Of course, such a rationalization would find theoretical support in the law and economics emphasis on protecting property rights to assure the proper incentives to produce intellectual
property. 184
The doctrinal sleight of hand necessary for the inevitable disclosure doctrine's indirect application in California thus does not require
a significant judicial stretch. But the analysis of the initial conditions
giving rise to Silicon Valley's second-stage agglomeration economy
admonishes California courts to exercise great caution before pursuing such an accommodation. Inevitable disclosure doctrine poses a
serious threat to the interemployer spillover of proprietary tacit
knowledge that allows Silicon Valley to reset its product cycle repeatedly. Given the uncertainty of the theoretical tradeoff between fully
protecting property rights and protecting the agglomeration economy
that supports the industrial district, courts should be reluctant to alter
the legal infrastructure that preserves the existing, and successful,
balance.185
182 Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelly Corp., 398 P.2d 147, 149 (Cal. 1965) (quoting
Gordon v. Landau, 321 P.2d 456 (Cal. 1958) (in bank)) (noting trade secret exception to
section 16600); see also supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
183 See supra note 101 and cases cited therein.
184 See supra note 157.
185 The doctrinal response to the indirect invocation of the inevitable disclosure doctrine
is also not difficult to construct. The cases in which courts have floated the possibility that
a covenant not to compete could be used to protect a trade secret have involved a tangible
trade secret, like customer lists. See, e.g., Milgrim on Trade Secrets, supra note 74,
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C. Emulating Silicon Valleys Success by ProhibitingCovenants Not
to Compete

My account of the legal infrastructure's role in Silicon Valley's
continued success has an obvious implication for regional planners
seeking to create or preserve local industrial districts: Simply repli-

cate that aspect of the legal infrastructure that provided the critical
initial condition. On this analysis, state legislatures should emulate
California by enacting the equivalent of Business and Professions
Code section 16600's prohibition of postemployment covenants not to
compete.18 6 Again, however, I think caution is in order in assessing
the policy implications of Silicon Valley's history.
Evaluating the prohibition of covenants not to compete requires
a trade-off between the districtwide benefits of knowledge spillovers
through employee mobility, and the costs of the reciprocal reduction
in the incentive for intellectual property investment that results from
the dilution of employers' property rights. With respect to Silicon Valley and Route 128, the balance seems to have favored agglomeration
economies over property rights protection. However, this balance
may well be quite local, depending on the characteristics of particular
industries. And because industries are not randomly distributed
§ 1.09[7] (citing cases). As a result, a court is in a position to enforce a narrow definition of
competition---one limited to the trade secret's particular tangible manifestation. In effect,
the covenant would provide somewhat broader protection than a no solicitation agreement, which the California courts have interpreted as barring direct solicitation of business,
but not indirect solicitation by means of the announcement of the employee's new position.
It would also parallel the distinction drawn by invention law based on whether .,Mtten
corroboration has triggered conception. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87. Most
important, such a narrow scope for the trade secret exception would exclude from the
doctrinal accommodation trade secrets involving tacit knowledge and the like which are at
the heart of Silicon Valley's knowledge spillover-based agglomeration economy.
186 While I am not aware of any legislature seeking to emulate the California Business
and Professions Code section 16600, in recent years the Texas Supreme Court appears to
have concluded that enforcing postemployment covenants not to compete is poor policy.
See Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Tex. 1987) (rejecting traditional
rule of reason analysis in favor of prohibiting any covenant that restrains employee's right
to engage in "common calling"). The Texas legislature responded in 1989 with the adoption of the Covenants Not to Compete Act, which resurrected traditional standards of
enforceability. See ch. 1193, § 1,1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4852-53, as amended by Act of June
19, 1993, ch. 965, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 4201-02 (codified as amended at Tex. Bus. &
Com. Code Ann. § 15.50 (West 1987 & Supp. 1999)). 'The dialogue between the Texas
Supreme Court and legislature continued for another round, this time concerning whether
at-will employment was sufficient consideration to support a postemployment covenant.
Jeffrey W. Tayon, Covenants Not to Compete in Texas: Shifting Sands From Hill to Light,
3 Tex. Intell. Prop. L. 143 (1995), and Crystal L. Landes, Comment, The Story of Covenants Not to Compete in Texas Continues, 33 Hous. L. Rev. 913 (1996), provide accounts
of this institutional debate. Given the growth of high technology industry centered in Austin, Texas, this series of events certainly warrants greater attention. I am grateful to Sam
Issacharoff for calling the Texas experience to my attention.
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across jurisdictions, each state's particular industrial population may
dictate a different balance. Rather than emulating California's blanket prohibition (which, after all, exists by historical accident not design), it may be that the rule of reason currently applied to
postemployment covenants not to compete by other industrial states is
flexible enough to allow for this kind of industry-by-industry approach. In assessing the validity of a particular covenant under this
legal regime, a court balances against the employer's interest in enforcing the covenant not only the employee's interest in mobility, but
also the public interest. 8 7 At least at the doctrinal level, this formulation invites courts to consider the public interest in a particular potential agglomeration economy, and invites the parties to present expert
testimony concerning the knowledge structure of the industry
involved.
Robert Merges and Richard Nelson provide some guidance about
how such an inquiry might proceed. 188 Patent law in general, and the
appropriate scope of a patent in particular, present a balancing issue
roughly analogous to that presented by the scope of protection provided by the law governing trade secrets and covenants not to compete. Patent law may encourage innovation through either of
conflicting means-a broad patent scope rewards innovators with the
full economic value of an invention, while a narrow patent scope encourages innovation by making it easier for subsequent investors to
improve on existing patented technology. In trade secret law, encouraging innovation through a broad scope for trade secret protectionthat is, by augmenting trade secret law through enforcing covenants
not to compete and thereby protecting tacit knowledge and preconception inventions-also conflicts with an alternative means to encourage innovation. A narrow scope for trade secret protection, as
with California's prohibition of postemployment covenants not to
compete, facilitates second-stage agglomeration economies by leaving
tacit knowledge and preconception inventions unprotected.
Merges and Nelson argue that the proper patent scope depends
on the nature of innovation in particular industries. 189 TWo of their
categories of innovation are instructive for our purpose. The first is
"discrete innovation," in which the invention's boundaries are clear
and, although subject to improvement, the invention is clearly not the
first step in a series of important technical advances. 190 They offer the
See supra text accompanying notes 88-93.
See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839 (1990).
189 See id. at 843.
187
188

190 See id. at 880.
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ballpoint pen as an example of this type of invention. 191 The second is
"cumulative technologies," in which innovation is additive in the sense
that it can be anticipated that fundamental technological advances are
both possible and will build on existing technology. 192 "Over time
dramatic advance occurs in these technologies from improvements to
one aspect or another, adding this new feature or that." 193 Computers
are an example of this type of technology.
Building on this typology, Merges and Nelson argue that a broad
patent scope is appropriate in industries characterized by discrete innovation; encouraging initial discovery by expansive property rights
incurs little offsetting cost by discouraging follow-on innovation. 194 In
contrast, a narrow patent scope is appropriate in industries characterized by cumulative technologies; the gains from encouraging follow-on
innovation exceed the costs of reduced incentives for initial invention.195 The same analysis may be appropriate with respect to trade
secret protection. Because Silicon Valley appears to be characterized
by cumulative technologies, California's narrow scope of trade secret
protection, effected by prohibiting covenants not to compete, would
be just about right.
Thus, it may well be that a state concerned with regional development today should not blindly seek to replicate the historical source of
Silicon Valley's success. Given the opportunity to act by design rather
than by historical accident, the better approach may be to craft a legal
infrastructure that has the flexibility to accommodate the different
balance between external economies and intellectual property rights
protection that may be optimal in different industries. In contrast, for
California, where the industrial distribution already reflects the longterm presence of Business and Professions Code section 16600, the
best course may simply be staying the course.

191 See id.

192 See id. at 884-97.
193 Id. at 881.

194 See id. at 880-81.
195 See id. at 908-09.
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